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Atkinson: Atkinson: Missouri's New Civil Procedure: A Critique

MISSOURI'S NEW CIVIL PROCEDURE: A CRITIQUE OF THE
PROCESS OF PROCEDURAL IMPROVEMENT
THoMAs E. ATKINSON*

Missouri now has a Civil Code. Section 2 of Senate Bill No. 34 of the
62nd General Assembly declares that the bill shall be known and cited as
the Civil Code of Missouri. This sounds as if there was to be a change in
substantive law to something like the system which Napoleon gave to the
world. However, it turns out that the code deals only with civil procedure
and indeed leaves a large part of that field unaltered. The bill by its terms
goes into effect January 1, 1945.' Before that date much will be said and
written in explanation of the practice under the new law.2 This is not the
purpose of the present paper, though to some extent that result may be
accomplished incidentally. The purpose of this article is to show: (1) how
far the code failed of the original purpose of the undertaking viz., to modernize Missouri procedure and to expedite and reduce the costs of trials and
appeals, (2) how far these failures may be remedied by rules under terms
of the code, (3) how a brighter future for the administration of justice
can be assured through an improved method of procedure-making.
HISTORY OF NEW CODE

To understand these things it is desirable to review briefly the movement which culminated in the new law. This history may start with an
attempt to obtain a grant of the rule-making power to the supreme court
*Professor of Law, University of Missouri. LL.B. 1917, University of Michigan; A.B. 1925, University of North Dakota; J.S.D. 1926, Yale University. Technical Adviser, Missouri Supreme Court Committee on Civil Procedure 1940-1943.
1. Committee Substitute for Senate Bill No. 34 [Truly Agreed to and Finally
Passed] § 3 (1943). The bill as passed appears in Mo. Laws (1943) pp. 353-397
and will hereafter be referred to as S.B. 34. The numbering of the sections is not
consecutive in all cases, due to the fact that several sections were stricken by

amendments without renumbering of the remainder. Other printed legislative versions of the bill are the original Senate Bill No. 34, Committee Substitute for Senate Bill No. 34, [Perfected] Committee Substitute for Senate Bill No. 34.
2. See Carr, Modernized Civil Code of Missouri (1944) 9 Mo. L. REV. 1.
Other discussions of the new code in its formulative stages appear in the Missouri
Law Review, the Missouri Bar Journal and elsewhere.
(47)
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1944

1

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 9, Iss. 1 [1944], Art. 6

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 9
3

by the Missouri General Assembly at its 1939 session. This attempt was
unsuccessful. Instead, the legislature passed a concurrent resolution inviting
the court to submit to the next General Assembly "suggestions for a revised
code and rules of civil procedure for consideration of said Assembly."' 4
Thereafter the court appointed a committee of fifty-three members of the
bench and bar to assist the court in carrying out the purpose of the resolution.
This committee was representative of the legal profession of the state. Due
to its size, however, the initial work was delegated to a subcommittee on
suggestions and plan, 6 which met frequently before reporting back to the
main committee. All the lawyers of the state were invited to offer suggestions as to the scope and details of recommendations to be made.7 There
were many responses, which ranged from suggestions of trifling amendments
to proposals that all statutes relating to procedure should undergo complete revision.8
The subcommittee decided to confine its attention in so far as possible
to Chapter 6 of the Revised Statutes, which is denominated "Civil Procedure
-General Code." Even after this had been decided there was a difference
of opinion as to the scope of amendments which should be proposed. The
view was taken by some that only a few most-needed improvements should
be suggested; others believed that Chapter 6 should be thoroughly modernized and recast. Those taking the latter view were thinking of patterning
the state procedure after the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which had
recently become operative. As the subcommittee was unable to forecast
which position would be favored by the main committee and by the court,
it decided to prepare two plans.
Plan I,' as submitted by the subcommittee, consisted of a dozen major
3. Report, Committee Cooperating with Missouri Institute for the Administration of Justice (1938) 9 Mo. B. J. 216.
4. Teasdale, Move to Improve Procedure Progressing Although Bill Is Defeated (1939) 10 Mo. B. J. 41; Teasdale, Efforts of Missouri Institute for Administration of Justice Finally Bear Fruit (1939) 10 Mo. B. J. 91; Report, Committee to Cooperate with Missouri Institute for Administration of Justice (1939)
10 Mo. B. J. 164.
5. The court named 54 to the committee. (1939) 10 Mo. B. J. 209. One dedined to serve. For a list of those remaining on the committee, see (1940) 11 Mo.
B. J. 199.
6. (1939) 10 Mo. B. J. 209, 223; (1940) 11 Mo. B. J. 18.
7. (1939) 10 Mo. B. J. 206; (1940) 11 Mo. B. J. 45.
8. Summary of Suggestiots Received by the Committee on Revision of Civil
Procedure and Rules (1940) 11 Mo. B. J. 45.
9. As tendered to the full committee Plan I consisted of a mimeographed
pamphlet of 44 pages. The amendments by the full committee were included in
a 7 page mimeographed pamphlet. Plan I. as so amended was printed in Report of
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol9/iss1/6
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proposals for improving the existing procedural statutes without any general
revision thereof, though there were also numerous harmonizing amendments
chiefly arising out of the existing provisions making pleadings and trials
dependent upon terms of court. Plan II 10 was more ambitious. Its provisions were patterned closely after the Federal Rules but it also contained
measures not contained in those rules." Under this plan as originally
proposed, the only articles of the present general code to be retained were
those on place of bringing actions, limitations, declaratory judgments, executions and exemptions, and costs, and even in these articles harmonizing
amendments were contemplated.:"
While in the clear majority of cases Plan II followed the provisions and
exact language of the Federal Rules there were some deviations therefrom.
There were various reasons behind these deviations. In the first place the
Federal Rules apply only to actions in the trial courts, and also the new
state procedure had to fit with the retained articles of Chapter 6 and other
Missouri procedural provisions. These factors called for a somewhat different
arrangement and organization from those used in the Federal Rules. Some
parts of the Federal Rules are applicable only to the federal courts, 13 and
Missouri Supreme Court to the Senate and House of Representatives of the 61st
General Assembly of the State of Missouri under House Concurrent Resolution
No. 23 of the 60th General Assembly of the State of Missouri (1941). See infra
text at notes 23 to 26. For a summary of the provisions of Plan I as amended by
the main committee and as submitted to the court, see Plans for Improvement of
Civil Procedure Submitted by Missouri Supreme Court Committee (1940) 11 Mo.
B. J. 193, 198.
10. As tendered to the main committee Plan II consisted of a mimeographed
pamphlet of 56 pages (hereafter cited as Plan II), together with a completion
draft of 27 pages (hereafter cited as Completion Draft). The amendments by the
main committee were included in a 16 page mimeographed pamphlet (hereafter
cited as Amendments to Plan II). Plan II, as so amended, was printed in Proposed General Code of Civil Procedure for the State of Missouri (1941). See infra
text at notes 23 to 26. For a summary of the provisions of Plan II as amended by
the main committee and as submitted to the court see, Plans for Improvement of
Civil Procedure Submitted by Missouri Supreme Court Committee (1940) 11 Mo.
B. J. 193, 199.
11. E.g. Plan II, p. 4 (term always open; id. p. 5 (compromise and payment
of infants' and incompetent persons' claims); id., p. 13 (service on infant or incompetent); id. p. 14-15 (service by mail and by publication); id. p. 16 (abolishing
conclusiveness of sheriff's return); id. p. 24 (motion searches record); id. pp. 28-31
(change of venue); id. pp. 34-35 (continuances); id. p. 37 (involuntary nonsuit
abolished); id. p. 37 (motioi in arrest abolished); id. p. 45 (from what appeal is
allowed); id. p. 51 (supreme court rules regarding transcripts and briefs).
12. Specefic harmonizing amendments were not presented for Plan II but
samples of specific harmonizing amendments can be found in Plan I. As for the
methods of dealing with the necessary harmoniiation of Plan II or the new Civil
Code with sections in other parts of the statutes, see infra text following note 262.
13. E.g. Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., Rule 22(2); Rule 23(b) (part).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1944
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these of course were omitted. In some cases the Federal Rules incorporate
the state procedure by reference, 14 and here, of course, the state practice had
to be made explicit. Change of venue was not treated generally in the Federal Rules at all.' 5 For psychological reasons the terms "petition," "referee,"
and "respondent," which have long been in use in the state practice, were
retained in the place of "complaint," "master," and "appellee" employed
in the Federal Rules. The substance of several old Missouri provisions were
6
retained because they had proved to be useful. A few new devices were borrowed from the procedure of other states.' 7 Occasionally attempt was made to
improve the language or the substance of the Federal Rules. However,
perhaps ninety per cent of the Federal Rules was contained in Plan II.
Primarily this was prompted by belief in the merits of the Federal Rules.
Of secondary, but none the less real, importance were the advantages which
were thought would result from uniformity between the state and federal
practice.'
Plans I and II were reduced to mimeographed form' and submitted
by the subcommittee to the main committee. After an opportunity for individual members to study the plans, the committee met twice to consider
them-the second meeting extending over two days. It was decided to
offer both plans to the court. Consideration was devoted specifically to
the provisions of Plan II, inasmuch as the substance of all provisions of
Plan I was included in Plan II. The main committee made many amendments in Plan II2--most of them dealing with matters of scope and substance rather than form. It was decided to retain the existing provisions
relative to change of venue, referees, judgments, and in the main also those
relating to depositions. With the exception of the provisions relative to
summary judgments,2 none of the proposed changes on these subjects were
considered at the subsequent stages of Plan II. In addition to these wholesale omissions the committee eliminated, changed, and rephrased a consider14. E.g. Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., Rule 4(d) (2); see also Rule 4(e).
15. See supra note 11 and infra text at notes 41 to 43 and following.
16. E.g. Plan II, p. 5 (parties to action arising in other states)- id. p. 21
(pleading slander and libel); id. p. 26 (counterclaims to assigned claims); id. p. 36
(jury trial of fraud in obtaining release).
17. E.g. Plan II, p. 4 (term always open); id. p. 5 (compromise and payment of infants' and incompetent persons' claims); id. p. 28 (transfer of case to
proper court).
18. See Report, Committee on Expediting Trials and Appeals (1940) 11 Mo.

B. J. 183.
19.

See supra notes 9 and 10.

20. See supra note 10.
21. See infra text at notes 96 to 98.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol9/iss1/6
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able number of the other provisions of the original plan. This resulted in
further deviations from the Federal Rules; in some of these cases the substance of existing Missouri statutory provisions were incorporated into the
plan in lieu of the Federal Rules provisions. 22
Though the supreme court was furnished with copies of the plans as
originally drafted by the subcommittee and was otherwise informally advised
as to the progress of the committee's work, the first report 23 of the committee
was not submitted until December, 1940. The court, desirous of making
thorough study of the plans and also of obtaining the reactions of the profession as a whole, asked for 2' and obtained a two year extension of time
within which to make suggestions to the General Assembly.25 An appropriation was obtained for the printing of the plans, and copies thereof were
distributed to the bar generally. The court appointed a special committee
to conduct meetings in various parts of the state to explain and discuss the
plans and to report to the court the opinion of the bar. 26 Committees appointed by two of the largest bar associations of the state rendered detailed
reports on Plan 11. 27 As a result of these meetings and bar association
reports the special committee reported that the majority of lawyers who
were in favor of any change supported the general mode and provisions of
Plan 11.28
The court then proceeded to revise Plan II in the light of its own study
and of suggestions and criticisms received after the printing and distribution
of the plan. For this purpose two members of the court, acting with the
chairman and technical adviser of the committee, drafted a number of
amendments including the restoration of some of the features which had
22. E.g. Proposed General Code of Civil Procedure for the State of Missouri
(1941) pp. 7-8 (service of papers); id. p. 13 (other parties-how brought in); id.
p. 50 (waiver of jury trial). The main committee also struck out the general Federal deposition provisions, thus continuing the existing state provisions which are
found in Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) c. 9, arts. 4, 6.
23. The report was mimeographed and was accompanied by mimeographed
copies of Plans I and II, and of the amendments thereto, together with a copy of
the transcript of the committee's proceeding upon consideration of the subcommitte's
drafts, minutes of the committee's meetings, and other documents.
24. See printed version of Plan I, supra note 9, pp. 3-6; (1941) 12 Mo.

B. J. 85.

25. (1941) 12 Mo. B. J. 129, 161.
26. Ibid.
27. Report of the Committee on Trial Practice of the Bar Association of
St. Louis and Report of the Committee on Proposed Changes in the Civil Code
of Missouri of the Lawyers Association of Kansas City (1942).
28. See Report, Committee on Amendments, Judiciary and PAocbdure (1942)
13 Mo. B. J. 124.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1944
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been eliminated by the main committee. These changes were submitted first
to the subcommittee and then to the main committee and no dissent was
registered. The committee's final report, 29 including Plan II as so revised,
was submitted in December, 1942. Except for a very few changes30 the court
submitted its suggestions to the General Assembly in the manner recommended by the final committee report.
The proposal was introduced in the Senate with no material change
from the court's recommendation. Two public hearings were held upon the
bill in the Senate. A number of lawyers and judges spoke in favor of the
measure-some of them generally and some upon particular features of the
bill. A committee of the Kansas City Bar Association proposed a number
of detailed amendments. Later the Senate judiciary Committee offered a
committee substitute bill which involved a number of substantial changes
but retained the general structure and most of the features of Plan Il. Thereafter, many amendments were made by the Senate-some dealing with substance, others with form. After passage of the bill by the Senate, the House
made a number of further amendments. Upon conference the bill was
finally agreed to and passed by both houses, and was approved by the governor on August 6, 1943.
GENERAL SCOPE AND CHARACTFR OF NE W CODE

First of all one is struck by the conservative scope of the new code.
Only half of the articles of Chapter 6 of the Revised Statutes are revised.
The articles on infants as parties, the place of bringing actions, limitations,
change of venue, declaratory judgments, referees and receivers, judgments,
executions, and costs remain unchanged. In only minor or incidental respects31 are the procedural provisions falling outside of Chapter 6 affected
by the act. The last section declares that the "present practice and procedure
in criminal cases shall not be changed except by a legislative act passed for
that specific purpose.

" 32
1

There is no intent here to criticize the new code simply on account of
its limited scope. Ideally perhaps all our procedural statutes should be carefully examined with the idea of both substantial and formal revision. Prac29. Final Report of the Missouri Supreme Court Committee on Civil Procedure (1943).
30. See infra text at notes 65 to 67.
31. S. B. 34, §§ 142, 144 relating to depositions. See also infra text at notes
228 to 236.
32. S. B. 34, § 145.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol9/iss1/6
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tically this is too great a task when the examination must be by a considerable representation of the bar, a court busy with judicial duties, and finally by the legislature engaged in its manifold tasks. it was doubtless wise to
decide to restrict the actual statutory revision to the general code. Many
of the improvements therein will apply to procedural provisions contained
elsewhere by the statutes. The extent of changes of this nature can be clarified by rule.3 3 Further needed procedural changes outside the general code
can await amendments and improvements at a later date.
However, the conservatism of the Civil Code is not confined to its
limited scope, but is manifested also in the limited number and kind of
procedural changes in the subject matter covered by the act. From the
standpoint of procedural reform, the original proposals of the subcommittee
were as progressive as any other American system-possibly the most
progressive. They could not be said to have been radical and did not embody
34
Unforthe more advanced features of the modern English procedure.
tunately for the interest of thorough-going procedural improvement, the
code as proposed by the subcommittee went through three processes of
revision-by the main committee, the court, and the legislature respectively.
In the process of these revisions certain improvements of a minor or formal
nature were made in the original proposals. Far out-weighing these improvements were the amendments which totally or partially eliminated devices
which would expedite and simplify Missouri procedure. To give an idea of
the extent of this process of rejection of modern procedural devices, a catalogue of the more important eliminations follows, with some brief comment
thereon.
PROVISIONS ELIMINATED BY MAIN COMMITTEE

(1) Provision that pleadings suzbsequent to the petition and other
papers may be served by mail.35 This is a common sense procedure as shown
by the fact that this vehicle is used by the government and business men
with regard to the transmissal of documents of the utmost importance. It
is also used frequently by lawyers in delivering pleadings, but if challenged,
does not constitute legal service of the paper. This provision was eliminated
from the code because it was thought that some lawyers would falsely deny
33. See infra text at notes 228 to 236.
34. E.g. the provision of Order 25. Rules 1-4 in Annual Practice (1939) permitting any point of law to be raised in the responsive pleading.
35. Plan II, art. 1, § 5 (1940); Amendments to Plan II, p. 1; S. B. 34, § 5(b).
Cf. Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., Rule 5(b) permitting service of papers by mail.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1944
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receipt of the paper. This is indeed a sad, though probably true, observation;
but this sort of subterfuge could be exposed if repeated more than once and
disciplinary action taken accordingly. The reflection upon the ethical standards of the bar is unfortunate enough but the rejection of a simple and inexpensive method of delivery of papers on that account is indeed a philosophy
of despair.
(2) Provision that a partnership or other unincorporated association
may sue or be sued in its common name.3"
(3) Provision that failure to make proof of service does not affect the
validity of the service37
(4) Provision that the signature of an attorney to a pleading constitutes
a certificate that he has read the pleading, that to the best of his knowledge
there is good ground to support it, that it is not interposed for delay, and
subjecting attorneys to disciplinary action for wilful violation.'s This is no
more than a statement of recognized principles of a lawyer's obligation.,,
'Attorneys who have had considerable experience under the Federal Rules
have informed the writer that a like provision in the Rules has done much
to discourage the assertion of unwarranted claims and defenses. 40 This
elimination by the main committee is hard to understand. Surely they could
not have believed that an attorney should be free to file a pleading knowing
that he had no ground to support it. Possibly the thought was that ethical
principles have no place in the code, a point of view almost as unfortunate.
If ethical principles are to be observed in daily practice they should not
be relegated to the canons of ethics, or to addresses before law students or
on the feast days of the bar. Nowhere are legal ethics of greater importance
than in the process of litigation, and nowhere is there a more appropriate
place for enunciation of those principles than in the code which provides the
rules under which litigation is to be conducted.

36. Plan II, art. 2, § 2; Amendments to Plan II, p. 2. Cf. Fed. Rules Civ.
Proc., Rule 17(b); Mayes v. United Garment Workers, 320 Mo. 10, 6 S. W. (2d) 333
(1928) holding a similar provision invalid as being not germane to the title of the
legislative act.
37. Plan II, art. 5, § 8(a); Amendments to Plan II, p. 4; S. B. 34, § 30(a).
Cf. Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., Rule 4(g).
38. Plan II, art. 6, §§ 3, 8, 11; Amendments to Plan II, p. 5; S. B. 34 §§ 34,
39, 42. Cf. Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., Rules 11, 8(b), 8(e)(2).
39. Committee on Professional Ethics, Association of the Bar of the City
of New York, Pamphlet No. III, Question 85 (1930); Missouri Supreme Court
Rule 35 (22).
40. See also Report, Committee on Expediting Trials and Appeals, 10 Mo.

B. J. 165 (1939).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol9/iss1/6
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(5) Provisions that actions started in a court lacking jurisdiction or
venue requirements should be transferred to the proper court rather than
dismissed, and that only the judge, and not the venue, be changed when
the objection is to the judge alone.41 All these provisions have been in force
in other states, 42 and the latter has been the statutory provision in Missouri
in criminal cases. 43 They are so obviously direct and sensible in their application that their rejection cannot be supported on any rational basis. They
fell with the committee's elimination of the entire new article on Change
of Court or Judge to supplant the present article on Change of Venue. The
latter was retained upon the ground that change of venue matters were -not
a serious trouble-spot in the existing procedure-a philosophy which underlay
much of the action of the main committee.
44
It
(6) Almost the entire deposition procedure of the Federal Rules.
is true that the existing Missouri provisions regarding depositions are, in the
main, satisfactory, and this is particularly so regarding the use of depositions
as a discovery device. Indeed with regard to the taking of depositions before answer, the Missouri provision." which permits depositions to be taken
as soon as the suit is filed, 46 seems superior to the Federal Rule, which permits depositions before answer only by leave of court.47 If change had been
made in this one regard and the Federal Rules provisions followed otherwise,
there would have been virtual uniformity in taking depositions for actions
in both state and federal courts with the marked advantages flowing from
that uniformity. The committee did preserve three of the deposition features
of the Federal Rules which the state procedure lacked. These were the provisions for the production of documents at the taking of depositions, for the
termination or limitation of the examination, and for submitting the deposi48
tion to witnesses for signature.
(7) Provisions relative to payment of expenses of proof by an attorney
who unreasonably refuses to grant discovery.49 It will be noted that the
committee adopted the main features of the Federal Rules regarding discovery
41. Plan II, art. 7, §§ 1, 2, 13-17; Amendments to Plan II, p. 6.
42. CAL. CODE CrV. Paoc., § 396.
43. Mo. REV. STAT. (1939) § 4040.
44. Completion Draft, art. 8 which supplanted the more limited provisions
in art. 8 of the original Plan II; Amendments to Plan II, pp. 7-9.
45. Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) § 1917 et seq.
46. State ex rel. Methudy v. Killoren, 229 S. W. 1097 (Mo. App. 1921).
47. Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., Rule 26(a); cf. id., Rule 27(a).
48. See infra notes 120, 140.
49. Completion Draft, pp. 10-11, § 12(a); Amendments to Plan II, p. 8;
S. B. 34, § 89(a). Cf. Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., Rule 37(a).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1944
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aside from deposition procedure, in lieu of the provisions of Article 12 of
Chapter 6 of the Revised Statutes. Certain changes were made from the
Federal Rules. The party might be obliged to pay the cost of proving a
fact which he should have admitted, but no penalty is imposed upon the
attorney who directs this course of conduct. The result is practical immunity
of attorneys from ethical obligation, and a lack of teeth in the discovery
procedure.
(8) Provisionrequiringdemand for jury trial within ten days after issue
joined, under penalty of waiver of jury.5° This measure is included in the
Federal Rules and a number of states have similar provisions. The committee rejected it upon the theory that it was undemocratic and would be
used to deprive a party of his constitutional rights. It has not worked out
so in the federal courts nor in the state courts which have this procedure.
Trial courts there have been quite willing to allow a late demand where
the case was based on negligence or some other type of action peculiarly
fitted for jury trial.51 The provision has been instrumental in shortening
the jury calendar. However, perhaps its greatest utility comes in cases
where both legal and equitable issues are presented by the pleadings. The
procedure brings up in advance of trial the matter of what, if any, issues
are triable by jury. A careful consideration can be made of these points if
due demand for jury is made; if no demand is made the chance for reversible
error is obviated by virtue of the waiver which follows from failure to demand a jury.
(9) Provisionthat the argument to the jury should precede the court's
charge.52 This would have promoted justice inasmuch as the arguments of
partisan counsel would be followed by the impartial charge of the court.
Distrust of trial judges and the desire of counsel to dominate trial proceedings has doubtless led to the rule which is now in force in Missouri and
surrounding states.5 It is sometimes claimed in the defense of the latter
practice that it permits counsel to argue the case upon the basis of the
charge given; that if the instructions come after the argument counsel can50. Plan II, art. 9, § 8; Amendments to plan II, p. 9; S. B. 34, § 98. Cf. Fed.
Rules Civ. Proc., Rule 38.
51. Peterson v. Southern Pacific Co., 31 F. Supp. 29 (S. D. Cal. 1940);
Gunther v. H. W. Gossard., 27 F. Supp. 995 (S. D. N. Y. 1939).
52. Plan II, art. 9, § 14(a); Amendments to Plan II, p. 10; S. B. 34, § 105(a).
Cf. Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., Rule 51. Doubt may arise under S. B. 34 § 105(a) as
to whether the charge should vrecede the argument. Cf. Mo. REv. STAT. (1939)
§ 1118.
53. See ZANE, THE STORY OF LAW (1927), 394.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol9/iss1/6
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not forecast what the instruction will be. No practical difficulty is encountered in those jurisdictions following the majority rule; this is particularly
so under provision of the Federal Rules that prior to the argument the
court shall inform counsel of the instructions to be given; indeed a somewhat
similar provision is included in the new code."(10) Provision that a plaintiff may -notdismiss his action after answer
55
without consent of the defendant, or leave of court. Instead of this, the
5
committee retained in effect the present Missouri provision " allowing dismissal at any time until the case is finally submitted to the jury, though
the limitation was added that after one such dismissal, a second dismissal
of right could not come after the jury was impanelled. This addition to
the present rule does little to alleviate the marked disparity between the
plaintiff and the defendant in choice of the time and place of trial. The
plaintiff has not only the original choice within the limits of the statute
of limitations and the venue statutes but also can have a second choice after
he has heard all the evidence in the case. He can have a third, fourth and
indefinite number of choices, provided he exercises these before the jury is
sworn. Of course, in some cases a plaintiff having a good case may fail to
show it at the trial through no fault of his own. It seems protection enough
to allow him to dismiss and try again only when permitted by the court.
A defendant's only remedy in a similar situation is to seek a continuance.
It seems unfair to permit such inequality between plaintiff and defendant.
57
(11) Special verdicts and special interrogatories.

54. Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., Rule 51, S. B. 34, § 105 (a). See infra text following note 115 and note 191.
55. Plan II, art. 9, § 10(a); Amendments to Plan II, p. 9; S. B. 34, § 99(a).
Rules Civ. Proc., Rule 41(a).
Fed.
Cf.
56. Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) § 1111. A slight amendment to § 1110 relative
to dismissal of suits in vacation was passed by the 1943 legislature. Mo. Laws
(1943) p. 397. Inasmuch as this amendment was approved prior to the date of
approval of the Civil Code, there is doubt as to whether it applies after the Civil
Code goes into effect. .The same problem arises as to Mo. Laws (1943) p. 399
which amended § 1225, which is also repealed by the Civil Code.
57. Plan II, art. 9, §§ 15, 16; Amendments to Plan II, p. 10. Provisions for
special verdicts and special interrogatories were inserted in Proposed Civil Code
of Civil Procedure for the State of Missouri (1941) p. 53, as an alternative for
the existing statutory provisions. Provisions for special verdicts were included in
the draft of the code as finally submitted to the court. See Final Report of the
Missouri Supreme Court Committee on Civil Procedure (1942) art. 13, § 16. However, special verdicts were eliminated by the legislature. See S. B. 34, §§ 106-111
See infra note 116.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1944
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(12) Provision that motion for directed verdict shall state the specific
grounds therefor.'8
(13) Provision that ten days be allowed for appellant to designate portions of record to be included in the transcript on appeal.5 ' The committee's
amendment allowed thirty days for this purpose.
The main committee originally eliminated summary judgment procedure in the process of rejecting the entire new judgment article,"r but this
device was reinserted before final report to the court."' Provision for special
verdicts, though not for special interrogatories, was also reinserted largely
as the result of discussion following the inclusion of these measures as alternative proposals in the printed version distributed to the members of the
bar. 2 Certain other changes were also made before final submission of the
report to the court. Appeal by special leave of the appellate court was
restored. "3 It was also provided that if motion for new trial was not passed
04
on within sixty days it should be deemed denied for all purposes.
CHANGES MADE BY COURT

Due doubtless in part to the fact that two members of the court took
part in suggesting final amendments to the committee, the court made few
changes in the draft of the code as finally submitted to the court. Most
of these were of a minor or formal nature. In addition, the court eliminated
the abolition of the requirement of consistency in pleading,"' and the abolition of the -necessity of motion for new trial for the purpose of review."
The writer doubts the wisdom of the elimination of these two simplifications
in civil procedure; moreover, these eliminations give rise to troublesome
67
questions of interpretation of the code.
The code suggested by the court to the legislature was thus very nearly
58. Plan II, art. 9, § 17; Amendments to Plan II, p. 10; S. B. 34, § 112. Cf.
Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., Rule 50(a). See infra notes 114, 115 and text following
note 191.
59. Plan II, art. 12, § 11(a); Amendments to Plan II, p. 12. Cf. S. B. 34,
§ 135(a). Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., Rule 75(a) requires the designation to be made
"promptly" after the appeal is taken.
60. Completion Draft, art 13, § 5; Amendments to Plan II, p. 13.
61. Final Report of the Missouri Supreme Court Committee on Civil Procedure (1942) art. 10. See text supra, following note 28.
62. See supra note 57.
63. Supra note 61, art. 17, § 7.
64. Supra note 61, art. 16, § 4.
65. Cf. supra note 61, art. 5, § 11 with original Senate Bill No. 34, § 42.
66. Supra note 61, art. 16, § 6. See also id., art 17, § 17(a); cf. original Senate
Bill No. 34, § 144(a).
67. See jufra text at notes 170, 171 and at 198 to 200.
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like the code as proposed in the committee's final report. The court, however, placed the measure in bill form by adding a title, a repealing clause,
and a final provision with reference to the effect of the act upon criminal
procedure. In translating the code into bill form the court eliminated the
division into articles and also the headings of the various sections and
subsections. These eliminations may have made more difficult the consideration of the bill by the legislature and may have led to some of the amendments which will cause trouble in the application of the code. The section
headings contained in the 1943 session laws were supplied by the Secretary
of State and differ from those used in the final committee report.
CHANGES MADE BY GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Senate Bill No. 34, as originally introduced, was almost identical with
the measure recommended by the court. Amendments by the score were
made thereafter by the legislature so that the committee substitute bill, the
perfected bill, and the final bill were each further and further away from
the court's recommendation. It would serve no purpose to set forth this
process of retrogression step by step; it is enough to list the more important
changes made in the General Assembly, regardless of the stage at which
they were made."'
(1) Elimination of grant of authority to the court to suggest forms of
pleadings, instructions and other proceedings. 9 There can be no doubt of
the advantages which would have come from an official promulgation of
forms.70 The bar and the trial courts would have the advantage of knowing
by illustration what the court regarded as a sufficient and proper form and
would not be obliged to rely on decisions holding good or bad some marginal
example. An approved form also gains in utility by being made available
in a single collection of forms. Specifically, the court could illustrate its
concept of the degree of particularity which the Civil Code requires of a
pleading-a question especially acute because the code sometimes follows
and sometimes departs from the Federal Rules provisions in this respect. 7 '
Of even more importance, perhaps, is the opportunity which would have
68. The changes irn this division are indicated by references to the draft appearing in the Final Report of the Missouri Supreme Court Committee on Civil
Procedure (1942), hereinafter referred to as Report, and to Senate Bill No. 34
as finally enacted.
69. Report, art. 1, § 9(a); S. B. 34, § 10(a).
70. Palmer Standardized Jury Instructions Succeed, (1940) 23 J. Am. Jim.
Soc. 177.
71. See inira text at notes 85 to 90 and at notes 166 to 169.
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been offered for errorless trials if approved forms of instructions could have
been offered.7 2 It is true that the original provision of Plan II did not
require the court to promulgate forms, but the court would probably have
done so under the moral pressure which would have resulted from the permissive provision.
(2) Omission of the short and simple Federal Rdes provision relative
to suits by and against infants and incompetent parties and restoration of
the twelve sections of the present article on infants as parties.TM This change
is typical of the action of the legislature in opposition to the principle of
uniformity when there is no reason for diversity. The original proposal seems
to contain everything that is necessary to provide on the subject. In one
important respect at least, it is more inclusive than the old sections in that
it covers incompetents while the old sections do not.
(3) Elimination of provisions requiring approval of court for settlement
of the claims to which an infant or incompetent person is a party, for the
allowance of attorney's fees and expenses in such, cases, and for payment
of the proceeds to the natural guardian when the proceeds do not exceed
$500.00.7 Similar provisions exist in New York and Pennsylvania."M They
have the advantage of protecting persons who are not sui juris, and also of
dispensing with the -necessity of a guardianship of property when the amount
is trifling, thus facilitating settlements. Objections to these provisions were
made upon the ground that there was no method for obtaining approval of
expenses in advance of their being incurred,"8 and because of fear of a
conflict between the jurisdiction of the circuit and probate courts."7 Instead
of facing these issues and, if necessary, providing amendments to clear up the
objections, the legislature took the easy way out and eliminated the provisions entirely. Procedural improvement does not spring from such fainthearted methods.
72. It has been found that 40% of the reversals in civil cases are due, at
least in part, to errors in instructions. (1936) 13 K. C. BAR BULL. No. 10., p. 11
73. Report, art. 2, § 2; S. B. 34, § 1, retaining Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) § 859
to 870. It should be noticed that § 869, in providing for neglect to procure appointment of guardian after the first day of the term at which defendent is bound
to appear, relates to a practice which has no application under the new code. See
S. B. 34, H9 58, 65.
74. Report, art. 2, § 3.
75. New York Civil Practice Act, § 980(a), Rule 294; Pennsylvania Rules
of Civil Procedure, Rule 2039 in 332 Pa. lxxxviii.
76. Supra note 27 at 5.
77. This objection was made by the committee of the Kansas City Bar Association at the hearings of the Senate Judiciary Committee.
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(4) Elimination of provision for service of process upon infants or incompetent persons wha have no guardian or curator by delivering a copy
to the person having charge of the infant or incompetent person." As a result
of this change service on these persons is had in the same method as service
upon those who are sui juris. Thus, service upon a two year old child playing
in his sandpile is perfectly good though the summons never comes to the
attention of any responsible person. Possibly the court might grant relief
in such a case though the code does not authorize it. At any rate the code
should not facilitate such abuses, and the new provisions seem to do so even
more than the former procedure under which there was no particular stat7
utory provision relative to serving persons not sui juris. ' From the last three
paragraphs, it can be seen that the position of infants and incompetent persons is not improved under the new code.
(5) Retention of the coroner to serve process when the sheriff is disqualified.0 This, of course, is in accord with the old English history of the
office of coroner, but it is not in accord with the modern tendency to abolish
the office and set up one of medical examiner."
(6) Elimination of the provision abolishing the conclusiveness of the
8 2
Here again Missouri retains the historical outlook of the
sheriff's return.
English law of centuries ago, in spite of the fact that in almost all other
states the return is no longer conclusive.83 Thus, in Missouri if the sheriff
files a return showing good service, the falsity of the return cannot be shown
in the action and the defendant must seek his remedy in a suit against the
officer for false return." Perhaps the sheriff or his bondsmen can then recover
from the plaintiff. Such circuity of action with recovery doubtful at each
stage has nothing to recommend it. Of course, a purchaser relying upon the
78. Report, art. 4, § 5(b)(2); S. B. 34, § 27(a).
79. See Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) § 880; Fischer v. Siekmann, 125 Mo. 165,
28 S.W. 435 (1894).
80. S. B. 34, § 26; cf. Report, art. 4, § 4; Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) §§ 13144,
13145.
81. See WILLOUGHBY, PRINCIPLES OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION (1929) 163-

173. Press reports show that abolition of the coroner and establishment of the

medical examiner is being urged upon the present Missouri Constitutional Convention.
82. Report, art. 4, § 8(a); S. B. 34, § 30. See infra text at 162, 163 and
following.
83. Sunderland, The Sheriff's Return (1916) 16 COL. L. REV. 281; RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS (1942) § 12, comments b, c.
84. Newcomb v. New York Central & H. R. R. 182 Mo. 687, 81 S.W. 1069
(1904).
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sheriff's return should be protected but the eliminated provision did that
in express terms.
(7) The retention of the requirement that the petition Mnust make a
statement "of the facts.""5 The term "facts" in connection with pleading
is not used in the Federal Rules, nor in the new code as submitted by the
court.86 This was not upon the theory that plaintiff need not state the
elements of his claim, but in order to dispense with the technical and bothersome distinction, which is purely one of degree, between "evidence," "ultimate
facts," and "conclusions of law"-a controversy which occupies more of the
Missouri appellate courts' attention than any other pleading question.87 It
is high time to recognize the impossibility of stating the facts "just as they
really are," and that it would be unprofitable to do so even if it were possible. 88 Pleadings serve the function of notifying the opposite party of the
general nature of the claim and defense, of steering the case in the way
it should go, and of indicating what has been decided in the case, but they
have not been successful for uncovering the opponent's evidence or the detailed particulars of his case or defense. " The retention of the word "facts"
indicates a legislative intent to retain the old code philosophy as to plead90
ing.
(8) Change of answer date from twenty to thirty days after service of the
petition.91 While even the thirty day period is shorter than the average under
the existing practice, it will be twice as long as the present minimum time. 2
This does not seem appropriate in a code designed to expedite procedure.
Of course there may be exceptional cases where even thirty days is not time
enough but an extension of time can be obtained in such cases under other
provisions of the code.93
(9) Elimination of application for change of venue from the matters
which may be consolidated with, motions and which. must be raised with
85. S.B. 34, § 36.
86. Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., Rule 8(a); Report, art. 5, § 5.
87. See 23 Mo. Dig. Cum. Ann. Pocket Part (1943) tit. Pleading, §§ 8-11.
88. Cook, Statement of Fact in Code Pleading (1921) 21 COL. L. RFv. 416;
Cook, 'Facts' and Statements of Facts (1937) 4 U. Cm. L. REv. 233; Wheaton,
Manner of Stating Cause of Action (1935) 20 CORN. L. Q. 185.
89. Clark, Simplified Pleading in JUDIcIAL ADMINISTRATION MONOGRAPIHS,
Series A,-No. 18, pp. 10-12, 19-20.
90. See Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) § 916. See, however, infra text at notes 166
to 169.
91. Report, art. 5, § 27; S.B. 34, § 58.
92. See Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) § 921.
93. S. B. 34, § 6(b). Cf. Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) § 942 where a narrower provision for extension of time is found.
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other motions under penalty of waiver.94 The philosophy of the motion
procedure in the new code is that all objections which can be then asserted
should be raised at one time. It was the plan of the draft submitted by the
court that application for change of venue should be included in this list.
True, if the application were based upon objection to the judge, he should
not decide other matters raised by the motion. That would doubtless be
implied and could have been made express in the code. The elimination of
the application for change of venue from this list seems to make that matter
in effect a separate motion, thus retaining in part the string of successive
objections which we have under the existing procedure9

5

(10) Elimination of summary judgment procedure."

This is a device

employed in a number of states, as well as in England and in the federal
courts, to give speedy judgment without trial where the plaintiff's claim or
defendant's defense is clearly without merit9

Through affidavits, deposi-

tions, etc., it often appears that, while a party's pleadings indicate merit
in his position, there is really no merit whatsoever. Summary judgment
procedure, with adequate safeguards against trying a case on conflicting
affidavits and other abuses, effectively and promptly disposes of these cases.
The elimination of this procedure from the code may have been based upon
distrust of trial courts. True, a judge might grant a summary judgment in
an improper case, but he can also direct a verdict in an improper case. The
remedy in both situations is the same-by appeal. Perhaps, after all, the
objection to the procedure was really based upon the professional antipathy
to anything which results in expedition. It may be remarked in this connection that most of the English reforms such as summary judgment originated through the efforts of laymen to inject a common sense attitude into
court procedure. 98 American lawyers also may well harken to criticisms of
laymen as to the expense and delays caused by traditional legal procedure.
(11)

Elimination of the permissive counterclaim allowing defendant to

assert any claim which he has against plaintiff.99 Apparently this was eliminated because it was thought that the rule might result in a single trial of

94. Report, art 5, § 30(3); S. B. 34 § 61(3).
95. See, however, infra text at notes 179-181 and following.
96. Report, art. 10. Cf. Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., Rule 56.
97. See Clark, Summary Judgments in JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION MONOGRAPHS,
Series A, No. 5.
98. See Sunderland, The Englisl Struggle for Procedural Reform (1926)
39 HARv. L. REv. 725.
99. Report, art. 6, § 2.
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several claims of unrelated and diverse natures. Yet, under the new code
a plaintiff may assert all claims which he has against a defendant in the
00
same action, and the court may order separate trial of any counterclaim.1
Trial convenience should be the test of what claims can be litigated in the
same case; it is not apparent'why it should make any difference whether
the parties are reversed as to some of the claims asserted. However, the fact
that the legislature did not see fit to adopt the broad rule of permissive
counterclaim is not the really important objection to this omission. The
vital thing is that unless the counterclaim arises out of the same transaction
or occurrence as the plaintiff's claim, where the defendant must assert the
counterclaim under penalty of waiver, the defendant apparently has no
right to counterclaim at all. This arises out of the fact that counterclaim
and set-off are purely statutory," 1 and the compulsory counterclaimlo2 is
the only one provided by the code as finally enacted. This leads to the
absurd result that when defendant is sued upon a note, he cannot counterclaim upon an unrelated note which he has against the plaintiff. That the
legislature never intended this result is apparent, but this result seems to
follow unless Section 37, which allows defendant to join as many claims
as he has against the plaintiff, applies to this problem. From its position
in the code, it is evident that the latter section is intended only as a rule
permitting joinder of several counterclaims and assumes that the code provides elsewhere what may be asserted as a counterclaim. However, construction of Section 37 so as to permit the assertion of any claim against
the plaintiff as a counterclaim would serve a useful purpose and may well
be the pragmatic solution.
(12) Elimination of the provision that amendments of claims arising
out of the same conduct, transaction or occurrence set forth in the original
10 3
This is a sensible
pleading,relate back to the date of the original pleading.
rule and is of major importance when the Statute of Limitations has run
before the amendment is made. It is no more liberal than some courts have
announced in absence of statute or court rule."' What is the effect of this
elimination? Does it mean that amendment may never relate back? Does
it preserve the present Missouri practice as to relation back, which is some100.
101.
220 Mo.
102.
103.
104.

S. B. 34, §§ 37, 97(b).
Frowein v. Calvird &Lewis, 75 Mo. App. 567 (1898); Fricke v. Fuetterer,
App. 623, 288 S.W. 1000 (1926).
S. B. 34, § 73.
Report, art. 7, § 3.
See Comment (1939) 4 Mo. L. Ray. 49.
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what less liberal? Is the court authorized to promulgate a substatutory rule
(possibly the very provision eliminated) to clarify the situation? No one
can say with any degree of assurance until the court has spoken.
(13) Elimination of provisions for request for admission of general
facts. 05 The amendment which brings this about is the limitation that
the request for admission must pertain to documents. This means that when
the matter of fact does not relate to documents, the party must rely on the
deposition procedure or the sanctionless pre-trial conference. As a result of
this amendment and limitations as to the penalty for failure to make discovery,""0 the provisions for discovery are not signally broader nor better than
under the existing procedure.
(14) Retention of the existing provision for a continuance when an
0 7
attorney in the case is a member of the legislature.'
While the presence
in the legislature of principal counsel engaged prior to the legislative session
should be, and under general provisionsos of the code would be, ground for
a continuance, the broad provisions of this section offer many opportunities
for abuse. There have been instances of defendants, already represented
by principal counsel, engaging an attorney-legislator for the sole purpose
of obtaining a continuance. At least one trial court in the state has placed
limitations on the sweeping provisions of the law. 0 9 The legislature did
alter the existing law by providing that the trial might take place if the
session of the legislature were recessed for twenty days or more. This guards
against some abuses of the privilege granted by the present law, but the
possibility of others remains as before. The provision may be also subject
to the technical objection that it lies partly outside the title of the act"0
since the provision provides for continuances in criminal as well as civil
cases.
(15) Elimination of broad principles of consolidation of actions for
trial and retention of the present narrow provision for consolidation only
when the demands are liquidated and the parties identical."'
105. Cf. Report, art. 12, § 4(a) with S. B. 34, § 88(a).
106. See supra text following note 49.
107. S. B. 34, § 96. See Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) § 1089.
108. S. B. 34, § 92.
109. See Recent Cases (1937) 2 Mo. L. REv. 530.
110. See also S. B. 34, §H 1, 2, 145.
111. S. B. 34, § 97(a). See Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) § 1094. Cf. Report, art.
13, § 7(a); Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., Rule 42(a).
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(16) Provision that plaintiff may take one involuntary nonsuit.112 The
involuntary nonsuit procedure is unique in Missouri and permits a plaintiff
to appeal from a judgment which has resulted from his own dismissal and
allows him to commence another action on the same cause if he loses the
appeal. The entire practice has been seriously criticized and it has been
suggested that the court which originated the procedure should strike it
down. 11 3 However, the situation is now worse than before because the code
gives the privilege of one involuntary nonsuit, and no longer does the matter
rest within the control of the court to overrule the decisions which originated
the present practice.
(17) Elimination of the requirement of specific objections to instrc.
tions before the same are given in order to complain thereafter of the instructions given." 4 Instructions have proved to be the most prolific source
of error in the trial of jury cases." 5 Under the existing procedure and under
the new code, a party need not object to instructions at or prior to the time
that they are given. He has days and weeks to study up the adjudged cases,
though he could not, or at least did not, point out the objection at the trial.
The new code gives the party an opportunity to object to instructions before they are given, but this does not reach the seat of the difficulty, for there
is no penalty for failure to object. Undoubtedly, the practice will continue
as before, unless the court, either by rule or decision, in effect reinserts the
requirement of specific objections to instructions.
8
(18) Elimination of provisions for special verdictS."
(19) The preservationof the bill of exceptions."7 This is a retrogressive
step because it apparently continues the archaic distinction between the
record proper and the proceedings at the trial with all the fruitless technicalities which have sprung from that distinction. 18 In this connection it
112. S. B. 34, § 99(b). Cf. Report, art. 13, § 9(b).
113. Heitz, Voluntary and Involuntary Nonsuits in Missouri (1940) 5 Mo.
L. REv. 131.
114. S. B. 34, § 105(a); cf. Report, art. 13, § 15; Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., Rule 51.
115. See supra note 72.
116. See supra note 57; Hyde, Fact Finding by Special Verdict (1941) 24 J.
AM. Jui. Soc. 144; Lipscomb, Special Verdicts under the Federal Rules (1940)
25 WASH. U. L. Q. 185; Sunderland, Verdicts, General and Special (1920) 29
YALE L. J. 253; McCormick, Jury Verdicts, upon Special Questions in
in JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION MONOGRAPHS, Series A, No. 8.

Civil Cases

117. S. B. 34, § 135(a). Cf. Report, art 17, §§ 1, 12.
118. See Hyde, Origin and Development of Missouri Appellate Procedure
(1937) 2 Mo. L. REv. 281; Stone, The Scope of Review and Record on Appeal irv
JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION MONOGRAPHS,

Series A, No. 16.
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is important to notice that exceptions are abolished': 9 but the bill of exceptions is preserved. Doubtless the profession will find some way out of this
anamoly, but there will be confusion until some ingenious theory is worked
out.
(20) Elimination of the provision for termination or limitation of examination upon the taking of depositions.120 This provision was designed to
prevent well-known abuses, and its omission is regrettable.
These are not all the substantial changes made by the legislature but
they are the principal ones. It is true that many lawyers would not agree
that all the changes and eliminations made by the legislature or by the
committee were unfortunate. However, it is believed that anyone who believes that a change in court procedure is necessary to keep up with the
demands of modern life and to compete with encroachments of non-judicial
tribunals would be in favor of the original version in practically all of these
cases. The particular measures failed for various reasons, some because they
were thought to operate unduly to the advantage of plaintiffs or of defendants, others because they were not understood, still others because of disinclination to grant power to the courts or relinquish legislative authority,
and doubtless others simply because of a spirit of resistance to change. For
one cause or another the great majority of substantial improvements of the
original Plan II were eliminated from the Civil Code as enacted.
2

AcCOMPLISMVIENTS

OF NEW CODE' '

What then is left of procedural improvement after so many of the features of the original plan have been eliminated? After the foregoing catalogue of eliminations the gains naturally cannot be impressive. Two provisions are of major importance: the elimination of terms of court as measures
of time for pleadings, trials, motions for new trials and appeals, etc., 2 2 and
the requirement that all objections to pleadings shall be raised at one time.123
Of real but of somewhat less importance are: provision for service by registered mail in cases where service might formerly be by publication;2 4 pre-trial
119.
120.
121.
REv. 1.
122.
123.
124.

S. B. 34, § 122.
Report, p. 80, § 1937(b); Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., Rule 30(d).
See generally Carr, Modernized Civil Code of Missouri (1944) 9 Mo. L.
S. B. 34, §§ 6(c), 7, 9, 22, 58, 65, 91, 116, 129, 130(a), 135(a).
Id., § 66.
Id., § 28.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1944

21

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 9, Iss. 1 [1944], Art. 6

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 9

conference, optional with the trial court, to eliminate unnecessary issues
and otherwise expedite trials;125 provision for taking a verdict and entering
judgment contrary thereto upon motion for directed verdict, thus preserving
the verdict if one should not be directed; 2 6 improved procedure for the trial
and review of non-jury cases; 27 elimination of the requirement of the
28
printing of the record on appeal.
Of less utility, largely because they will apply in only a limited number
of cases are: broader rules of joinder of parties and claims;"20 express provisions for class suits and their extension to legal actions; 30 provisions for
8
bringing in third parties liable over to the defendant or to the plaintiff;' '
express and broader rules for interpleader 8 2 and intervention; 8 8 simpler
rules for substitution of parties upon death, etc.;' 34 validation of trials of
issues outside the pleading when tried by consent of the parties;18i somewhat broader rules of discovery;' 36 abolition of writs of error 8 7 and improved
rules for appellate practice,1 8 except the rules regarding the making up of
the record; 8 8 provisions for requiring the production of documents upon
40
the taking of depositions'
The new code contains other new measures which are of comparatively
minor importance.' 41 Then too there are many cases where the Missouri
rule will be stated in the terms of the Federal Rules but many of the advantages of uniformity were taken away by capricious and needless tinkering
in the course of the committee-court-legislature hurdles. Indeed, it may
even be somewhat of a nuisance to determine when one should and when
one should not go to decisions under the Federal Rules for guidance in the
new Missouri practice. On the side of substance, most of the important
125. Id., § 84.
126. Id., § 113.
127. Id., § 114.
128. Id., § 13(b). Cf. Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) § 1197. See infra text at notes
208 to 210.
129. S. B. 34, §§ 16, 37.
130. Id., § 19.
131. Id., §20.
132. Id., § 18.
133. Id., § 21.
134. Id., § 22.
135. Id.l§ 82.
136. Id., § 85-89.
137. Id., § 125.
138. Id., §§ 129-134, 136-140.
139. Id., § 135. See infra text before and after notes 208-210.
140. Id., § 142.
141. E.g. id., § 99, limiting voluntary and involuntary nonsuits after the first.
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changes made by the new code could have been accomplished by a dozen
amendments1 42 to the existing code leaving the more comprehensive treatment await a time more propitious to procedural reform. Such a plan probably would have avoided most of the difficulties which are enumerated in the
following pages.
UN cERTAINTIES OF NEW CODE

The foregoing matters should be of interest to every one who has at
heart the future of government by law. However, the immediate concern
of the practicing lawyer and the court busy in the performance of every
day duties will not be so much with the procedural devices which have been
omitted from or included in the code as with the actual operation of the act
as passed. The code as originally drafted, and as finally submitted to the
court, had internal coherence in that the various parts were synchronized
with each other. True, every section was not self-explanatory so that a
practitioner-particularly one familiar only with the present state practice
-who runs might read. True also, that some sections were general in
phraseology and were designed to indicate flexibility so as to permit both
counsel and court to exercise discretion. These "uncertainties" were those
of the Federal Rules. For most practical purposes they had been resolved
by what had been said, written, and held in connection with the Federal
Rules. Practitioners whose work had brought them into the federal courts
were already familiar with them, and adequate sources of information would
be open to all the bench and bar.
Unfortunately the legislature in the course of making eliminations and
changes in the plan did not seem to consider the effect of particular changes
on the code as a whole. One can detect the determined-not to say iratepen of the legislator bent on striking out this or inserting that. The immediate purpose of these changes is generally apparent, but there is often obscurity as to the legislative intent with reference to provisions with which
the amended sections were dovetailed. While some of these instances may
present no practical difficulties, all of them mar be regarded as unfortunate,
for lack of a consistent theoretical basis is an objection to a procedural
system, independent of particular problems. Moreover, many of the legislative changes do inject difficulties into the practice, and until these dif142. Plan I was such a scheme, though it is interesting to notice that about half
of its parallel provisions were eliminated from Plan H.
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ficulties are resolved by rule or reported decision some of the commonest
steps in litigation must be conducted upon the basis of guess work and makeshift to the harassment of bench and bar and to the prejudice of client's
substantive rights. The present division of this paper is devoted to a discussion of the particular uncertainties of procedure which inhere in the
Civil Code. They will be set forth in the order in which they appear in
the code. Some of them are of no great moment and the solution of others
may be drawn from the language or spirit of the code. The list has been
compiled as the result of an armchair contemplation. Doubtless lawyers
faced with particular problems will detect other difficulties as soon as the
code goes into operation.
(1) Service of pleadings and other papers. For no apparent reason
the legislature recast the wording of Subsection 5(a).14 3 As this subsection
now reads every pleading subsequent to the original petition must be served
upon each of the parties affected thereby, bringing it into partial conflict
with Subsection 5(c) which provides that where there are an unusually
large number of defendants the court may order that the pleading of defendants and replies thereto need not be served between defendants. Situations calling for resolution of this conflict will not often arise and probably
the specific provision of Subsection 5(c) will be deemed to prevail over the
general language of Subsection 5(a). However, the amendment is illustrative of legislative tinkering with the clear provisions of the original draft,
without consideration of other parts of the code.
A more serious related matter arises in connection with Subsection
5(d) which provides that after the petition all papers required to be served
shall be filed before service or within five days thereafter. 144 The matter was
originally put in this fashion with the idea that the code would provide
specifically for the time for service and make the time for filing dependent
on the time of service. The situation could have been reversed, by providing
specifically for the time of filing the various papers and generally for time
of service dependent on time of filing. Apparently this is the method which
the legislature preferred for in various subsequent sections of the code
pertaining to the time for pleadings, motions, etc., the word "filing" was
143. Section numbers in the text hereafter are to S. B. 34, except where
otherwise noted.
144. The original version was the same except that it provided for filing within a reasonable time instead of five days. Report, art. 1, § 4(d); see Fed. Rules
Civ. Proc., Rule 5(d).
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inserted in the place of service.145 However, no corresponding change was
made in Subsection 5(d). As a: result the code provides specific times for
the filing of various papers, and provides generally that the time of filing
shall be before service or within five days thereafter but it does not tell
when or whether a paper should be served. This of course is not a vital
matter. It can be clarified by rule, and perhaps can be solved without rule
by filing and serving simultaneously, 146 but persons dealing with a code
have the right to expect that the code should be explicit and clear as to
such routine matters.
(2) Time within which judgment may be altered by the court. Under
the common law rule which now prevails in Missouri the trial court may
alter the judgment at any time during the term at which it was rendered
but not generally thereafter. 47 Subsection 6(c) deals with the effect of
expiration of the term. The original version would have permitted judgments
to be altered within the period during which the court could haye granted
new trial of its own initiative. 48 The concluding language was "inany civil
action which has been pending before it." The legislature amended this so
1 49
This change
as to read "in any civil action... which is pending before it.'
law rule
common
the
of
whether
of phraseology gives rise to the problem
still governs the time within which judgments may be altered, whether there
is no limit to the time for such alterations, or whether the amended provision
for granting of new trial of the court's own initiative within thirty days indicates the period within which the judge is deemed to hold the judgment in
his breast. Until the court has spoken no one can be sure.'
(3) Suits in representative capacity. Section 11 is very nearly the
Federal Rules version of the real party in interest provision. However, after
declaring that an executor, administrator, etc., may sue in his own name,
the words "in such representative capacity" have been inserted. *These words
145. S. B. 34, §§ 20, 58, 65, 81 (filed and served), 116, 118, 120. Cf. id., §§
6(d), 75, 85 where service is also mentioned.
146. See Carr, Modernized Civil Code of Missouri (1944) 9 Mo. L. REv. 1,
text at note 8.
147. State ex rel. Maple v. Mulloy, 322 Mo. 281, 15 S.W. (2d) 809 (1929).
Cf. Mo. REv.

STAT.

(1939) § 1247-1250, 1266, 1267.

148. Report, art. 1, § 5(c); id., art. 16, § 5.
149. S.B. 34, § 6(c).
150. There is the additional difficulty that the legislature enlarged the time
within which the court could grant new trial of its own initiative from 10 to 30
days. S. B. 34, § 119. This may result in inconvenience because appeal must be
taken within ten days. Id., § 129. See infra text at notes 202, 203 and following.
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are not in the present Missouri "real party in interest" statute,' ' nor in
any other code so far as the writer is aware. No one has ever supposed that
any real party in interest statute gave the representative a personal beneficial interest. The insertion of these words causes confusion because executors and administrators do not always sue in a representative capacity, as
in case of action upon contracts made by them, for personalty converted
15 2
The difficulty goes
from them, and upon judgments recovered by them.
cases should be
such
in
actions
whether
of
deeper than the mere question
prosecuted by plaintiff "in a representative capacity." A grave question
arises as to whether a foreign representative can hereafter sue at all in
such cases. He may do so under the existing law on the theory that he
sues as an individual. 153 Probably he will be permitted to do so under the
new code, but if so, it is hard to explain the added words. This insertion
is an illustration of amendments which are pointless for any purpose and
which display a lack of complete understanding of the existing law.
(4) Motions to drop and add parties. Subsection 17(b) provides that
such motions may be made as provided in Section 65 and if so made the
provisions of Section 65 as to consolidation of motions and waiver of objection apply. Both references to Section 65 are obviously erroneous; the first
should be to Section 61 and the second to Section 66. Are such clerical
errors to render the subsection meaningless, or are they to be corrected in
the course of interpretation? More important ramifications with reference
to this section also arise as in connection with the general provisions regarding time for motions' 5 4
(5) Substitution of parties because of deatk after final judgment and
before appeal. Subsection 22(a) is a simplified provision for substitution
of parties on death and will stand in lieu of the complicated and technical
provisions now existing with reference to revivor. Part (1) of this subsection
permits substitution generally upon motion of either party. Part (3) pro151. Mo. Ray. STAT. (1939) §§ 849, 850.
152. Thomas v. Relfe, 9 Mo. 377 (1845); Hall v. Harrison, 21 Mo. 227 (1855);
Smith v. Monks, 55 Mo. 106 (1874); Rittenhouse v. Ammerman, 64 Mo. 197 (1876).
Apparently, in Missouri action in such cases may also be brought in a representative capacity. Rector's Executors v. Langham, 1 Mo. 568 (1825); Mosman v.
Bender, 80 Mo. 579 (1883). See generally 2 WOERNER, ADMINISTATION (3rd. ed.
1923) § 303.
153. Abbott v. Miller, 10 Mo. 141 (1846); Hall v. Harrison, 21 Mo. 227 (1855);
Tittman v. Thornton, 107 Mo. 500, 17 S.W. 979 (1891); see Richardson v. Busch,
198 Mo. 174, 187-188, 95 S.W. 894, 897-898 (1906). See generally RESTATEMENT,
CONFLICr OF LAWS (1934) §§ 483-508.
154. See infra text following note 181.
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vides for dismissal as to the deceased party if substitution is not made within
one year after death. In the original version it covered only the cases where
death occurred prior to final judgment, or after appeal. 5 5 The theory was
that if there was final judgment but no appeal, substitution would have to
be had before further steps such as execution or subsequent appeal were
taken, that these steps would have to be taken within the ordinary time 50
required by law in cases generally, and that there was no need for any
provision for dismissal or the like in this situation. However, the legislature thought differently and provided that if death occurs after final judgment and before appeal, the action should be dismissed if substitution were
not made within one year. Provision for dismissal of an action after final
judgment is an anamoly of nomenclature, if not a theoretical impossibility.
Regardless of this factor, was it intended to get rid of a final judgment as to
the deceased party after one year merely because of failure to substitute a
representative? Often execution is not taken on a judgment for considerable
time. What good is accomplished by nullifying a final judgment because of
death without substitution? The utility of substitution or revivor is applicable to pending actions and appeals and not to dormant judgments.
The insertion of this provision is fraught with still further difficulty.
The one year within which substitution is required, and hence apparently
permitted, will give rise to the claim that appeal may be taken after substitution at any time within one year in case of death of either party. This
interpretation is not a necessary one and furthermore conflicts with Section
129 which provides that notice of appeal shall be filed within ten days after
judgment. The automatic extension of time to appeal by reason of death
would be extremely undesirable, though death would undoubtedly often be
ground for allowing an appeal by leave of the appellate court within six
months under Section 130. It should also be noticed that the time within
which one must move for new trial or take an appeal cannot be extended
by the court under Subsection 6(b). Probably all these factors will combine
to lead to a denial of a general right to appeal within one year in case of
death of a party. Still there is doubt as matters now stand.
(6) Commencement of action. In the original version it was simply
declared that action is commenced by filing the petition in the office of the

155. Report, art. 2, § 12(a)(3).
156. Unless extended under Report, art. 1, § 5(b) which is repeated in S. B.
34, § 6(b).
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clerk,157 who in the next section is thereupon required to issue a summons
forthwith and deliver it for service. Apparently the legislature mistrusted
the simplicity of this provision for it inserted in lieu of the first section, the
present Missouri statute' relative to commencement of actions, under which
it has been held that if the plaintiff directs the clerk not to issue a summons, the action is not commenced so as to stop the running of the
Statute of Limitations. 9 However, the next section commanding the
clerk to issue a summons on filing of the petition remains substantially as
in the original version of the new code. This gives rise to doubt as to
whether the "suing out of process" which is necessary under the terms of
the present section inserted by the legislature has any meaning. Probably
the construction of that section will be continued under the new code but
the matter is not clear. This situation illustrates the incongruity which
may arise by slapping a section of the Missouri statutes into the body of
the Federal Rules provisions. Even if practical difficulties do not arise at
once, incongruities of concept and phraseology do. The old section which
is inserted is also subject to the objection of beingbeyond the title of the
new code so far as it applied to courts not of record.
(7) Proof of service by -mail. Subsection 30(b) originally provided that
proof of service by mail should be by certificate of the clerk that he had
mailed a copy of the summons and petition. To this the legislature added
"and by the return registered mail receipt ... which shall be filed as a paper
in the particular lawsuit." Of course there is no doubt as to the propriety
of filing such receipt and indeed of requiring the filing if the receipt were
returned. However, the question will arise under this added provision,
whether or not a receipt signed by the defendant addressed is a requirement
for service, and whether or not defendant must receive the mailed notice to
effect good service. The section'8 0 providing for service by mail does not
require that the defendant receive the summons, and similar statutes elsewhere have been interpreted not to require actual receipt.161 The legislative
addition to the manner of proof of service throwh doubt upon this matter
which cannot be resolved without a judicial determination.
157. Report, art. 4, § 1. Cf. Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., Rule 3.
158. Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) § 876; S. B. 34, § 23.
159. White v. Reed, 60 Mo. App. 380 (1894).
160. S. B. 34, § 28.
161. See in re Rowley's Will, 114 Misc. 375, 186 N. Y. Supp. 656 (1921);
Simonton v. Simonton, 40 Idaho 751, 236 Pac. 863, 42. A. L. R. 1363 (1925);
Hazard v. Hazard, 205 Ill. App. 562 (1917).
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(8) Conclusiveness of sheriff's return. The legislature eliminated the
portions of Section 30 which would have permitted impeachment of the
sheriff's return except as to persons who have changed their position in reliance upon the return. 16 2 Apparently it was not noticed that Section 31
permits the court at any time in its discretion to allow amendment of the
process or the return. Section 31 is broader in its terms than the existing
statute' 3 regarding amendments of the return. The amendment may be
at any time and apparently upon the motion of any person; the only limitation is that the amendment should not prejudice the rights of the party
against whom the process issued, a provision which would relate principally
to amendment of the process rather than the return. The effect of Section
31 may be to nullify in effect our common law rule forbidding impeachment
of the return, which rule has been abandoned in most states, but this is not
certain. Quite evidently it was intended to preserve the Missouri rule forbidding impeachment of the return. The question is, however, has this
been done in the light of the retention of the broad provision for amendment
of the return? This situation presents an interesting problem as to whether
the court in deciding the matter or in framing a substatutory rule upon
the subject will consider the known views of legislators taking an active part
in the amendment of the code bill, or will refer only to the cold remnants
which were enacted into law.
(9) The permissive reply. Section 32, relative to required pleadings,
follows generally Federal Rule 7(a). A reply is required in case of a counterclaim and also if the court orders a reply. The Federal Rule declares that
no further pleadings shall be permitted,while Section 32 says that none shall
be required. The General Assembly is not responsible for this change, it
64
having been made at the stage following discussions of Plan II by the bar.
The thought behind the change is that a plaintiff, should be permitted to
file a reply if he wishes to do so. However, a plaintiff has no reason to
file an unrequired reply (unless perchance the reply could be regarded as
an amendment to the petition) because the filing of the reply would not
enlarge the proofs which the plaintiff could introduce.6 " Defendant might
obtain an advantage from a reply but he cannot require it save in the two

162.
163.
Stewart,
164.
165.

See supra text at notes 82 to 84.
Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) §§ 971, 974, 984. See State ex rel. Brown v.
313 Mo. 1, 281 S.W. 768 (1925).
Cf. Plan II, art. 6, § 1 with Report, art. 5, § 1.
S. B. 34, § 41.
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excepted cases. Under the wording of Section 32 pleadings may go on indefinitely if the parties desire. This is a situation not apt to happen but
if it did it would be hard to tell when the pleadings are closed within the
meaning of Section 68 relative to motion for judgment on the pleadings,
or when issue is joined within the meaning of Section 91 relative to putting
cases on the trial docket.
(10) Necessity of pleading "facts." It has already been noticedoo that

the legislature substituted the word "facts" for "claim" in specifying the
requisites for a pleading of a claim for relief. It would be regrettable enough
if this resulted in the preservation of the old fruitless technicalities of pleading. However, the situation is worse than that, for it is not at all clear
from the whole code what the legislature intended in this regard. Other
sections16 7 of the code retain the Federal Rules language of statement of
claim, instead of statement of facts. Moreover, Section 63 in providing
for a motion for more definite statement declares that the latter is only
to enable the moving party to prepare his responsive pleading or prepare
generally for trial when a rsponsive pleading is not requiredo8 Finally the
Federal Rules provision regarding pleading defenses is retained"', and nothing
is said therein about pleading facts. Is more specific pleading required in
the petition than in the answer? It is particularly unfortunate in this
connection that the court's authority to promulgate forms of pleading was
eliminated from the code; court forms might, as a practical matter, solve
the problem. As the result of the change of a single word we are plunged
into new difficulties with regard to the manner of pleading. The old procedure in this respect would have been preferable to a garbled version of the
Federal Rules provision.
(11) Consistency of pleading. The court struck from Section 42 the
words "regardless of consistency" in the provision allowing a party to state
as many claims and defenses as he has, and the legislature followed the
court's version in this respect.170 If these words had been permitted to remain it would have been clear that inconsistency of claims and defenses
would be no objection to a pleading. This is as it should be, because a
166. Supra text at notes 85 to 90.
167. S. B. 34, §§ 42, 43, 62, 66, 67, 72.
168. Cf. Carr, Modernized Civil Code of Missouri (1944) 9 Mo. L. REv. 1,
text following notes 36 and 63.
169. S. B. 34, § 40.
170. Cf. Report, art. 5, § 11 with S. B. 34, § 42. See Carr, Modernized Civil
Code of Missouri (1944) 9'Mo. L. Rxv. 1, text at note 43.
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pleader cannot and never expects to prove both of two inconsistent facts
or to recover upon both of two inconsistent claims. Inconsistent pleading
indicates doubt as to which the pleader will be able to establish. In general
he can avoid the effect of his doubt by the use of alternative or hypothetical
pleading which the section specifically allows. Elimination of these words
does not forbid inconsistent pleading. There is enough left in Section 42
and in other sections of the new code to leave the matter unsettled and the
fact that the rule against inconsistent pleading has not been carried to its
logical extreme in the existing practice' complicates the problem. As a
result the bench and bar will be plagued with controversies over a purely
formal matter and the situation may never be entirely clarified, as it has
not been under more than 90 years of the present code.
(12) Allegations of capacity of parties. Following the Federal Rules,
the original version of Section 45 provided that it is not necessary to
allege the capacity 'of a party.1 2 The legislature altered the phraseology
so as to read that it shall be sufficient to aver the ultimate fact of the
capacity of a party. This leaves it uncertain whether it will be necessary
to allege the capacity of a party. Arguendo perhaps it will be, but there has
been no general requirement that capacity be alleged, directly. under the
existing practice. 3 The new language on top of the old' practice leaves
one more question in doubt.
(13) Allegations of time and place. Section 51 of the original bill was
4
It provided that for the purpose of testing
stricken by the legislatureY.1
the sufficiency of a pleading, averments of time and place are material and
shall be considered like all other averments of material matter. This was
a statement of the existing rule, at least as regards the raising of the Statute
of Limitations by demurrer." 5 It is not probable that the legislature intended
that allegations of the time should not be regarded as material for the purpose of raising the objection of failure to state a claim by motion under
Section 62. Still it may be some time before the rule is absolutely clear.
(14) Judicial notice of foreign law. Subsection 54(b) originally provided that the court should take judicial notice of the law of another state
171. Thus the general denial and contributory negligence, though they seem
inconsistent, may be pleaded together. See Klienlein v. Foskin, 321 Mo. 887,
13 S.W. (2d) 648 (1929); note (1927) 35 Mo. BULL. L. SEaL 35.
172. Report, art. 5, § 14.
173. CLARK, (1928) CODE PLEADING, 222-225.
174. Report, art. 5, § 20.
175. Burrus v. Cook, 215 Mo. 496, 114 S.W. 1065 (1908).
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17

when that law was pleaded.
The legislature changed the word "pleaded"
to "relied on." The latter is a broader term and the legislature's version
appears to be a more liberal provision. Difficulty arises, however, in the
ambiguity of the words "relied on." When is the foreign law "relied on"?
Must the pleading say expressly that it is relied on? Is it enough, or is it
necessary, that the pleading disclose that the foreign law is applicable under
conflict of law principles? Must the foreign law be expressly pleaded in
order to be judicially noticed? Literally it would seem that it need not
be pleaded; but if so, is not this placing an undue burden on busy trial
courts which usually do not have the sources of foreign law readily at hand?
(15) Time for answer in case of service by mail. The original version
of Section 58 required answer within twenty days after service by mailing,
service being deemed complete three days after mailing.'" The legislature
changed the general answer date from twenty to thirty days, and in the case
of service by mail required that the answer should be made within thirty days
after filing of the return registered mail receipt. This raises again the ambiguity as to whether the defendant must receive the summons or petition or
whether the proper mailing constitutes the service.18 Independent of this it
is awkward to have the answer date dependent upon the filing of the return
receipt. A defendant so served will usually be a non-resident of the state
and it seems inconvenient to require him to ascertain when, if ever, the
receipt was filed in order to determine the time within which he should
answer.
(16) Application for change of venue as postponing the answer date.
In Section 61 the legislature struck out application for change of venue from
the list of objections and other matters which might be raised by motion
though the same did not appear on the face of the pleading."D Section 58
provides that motions under Section 61 postpone the answer date. With
application for change of venue stricken from Section 61, it is open to some
question whether such application postpones the answer date. It obviously
should, but there is nothing in the retained change of venue article or in
the new sections of the code which so declares.18 0
(17) Extent of consolidation and waiver of objections. Under the orig176.
AcT, in
177.
178.
179.
180.

Report, art. 5, § 23(b). Cf. UNIFORM JUDIcIAL NOTICE
9 U. L. A. (1942) 269.
Report, art. 5, § 27.
See supra text at notes 160, 161.
Cf. Report, art. 5, § 30(3) with S. B. 34, § 61(3).
See supra text at notes 94 to 95.
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inal version of Section 66 the provisions for consolidation and waiver of objection applied by its terms only to the objections under the pleading article
and hence only to the motions in Sections 61, 62, 63, 64.11' The words "under
this article" were stricken by the legislature, because the bill in legislative
form was not divided into articles. However, no other restrictive words
were inserted in their place. ,As a result, Section 66 by its terms applies
to any motion then available to the party. Of course the motions commonly
made at the trial are of necessity excluded but motions relative to parties
and applications for change of venue are not. The party objection in particular presents a problem, for Section 17 is framed upon the theory that
the motion may be made at other times. Here is an inconsistency between
sections of the code which may give trouble. In Sections 65 and 69 relative
to the time and hearing of motions, the legislature likewise struck out the
words "under this article" and inserted nothing in their place. There is a
similar lack of clarity as to what motions these sections apply, though no
serious problem is perceived with reference to these sections.
(18) Elimination of permissive counterclaim. This matter has already
been discussed;18 2 if it is not clarified an intolerable situation will be presented.
(19) Elimination of provision for relation back of amendments. This
matter also has received attention in a prior division of this article. 8 3 If
the Federal Rules provision was deemed too liberal, the proposed provision
might have been recast. Its elimination leaves in doubt when, if at all,
amendments will be deemed to relate back. A battle-ground is left without any guide as to the principles to be applied; it may be many years
before these are determined.
(20) Trial of issues by direction of tihe court. Section 82, following the
wording of Federal Rule 15(b), provides that when issues not raised by the
pleadings are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall
be treated as if amended. In the version submitted by the coure the words
"or by direction of the court" were included with cases of trial by express
or implied consent. 8" These added words were stricken by the legislature.
Their purpose was to cover the situation where a party objected to evidence
as being outside the issues, and the court, not deeming the objection mate181.
182.
183.
184.

Report, art. 5, § 35.
See supra text at notes 100-102.
See supra text at notes 103-104.
Report, art. 7, § 2.
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rial, did not order an amendment though he would and could have done so
if the matter had been pressed. 185 Possibly the trial of such issues may not
be error even under the wording which remains, but it is apt to be years
before a complete philosophy as to this problem is attained through decision.
(21) Place of pre-trial conference. In Section 84 the legislature in pro-

viding for permissive pre-trial conference added the words "in the county
where the case is pending."188 The problem is raised as to whether the
requirement is jurisdictional, or may be waived. Surely the parties should
be permitted to hold the conference outside the county by consent. That
might be a reasonable construction of Section 84, if it were not for the
fact that Section 70 permits proceedings except trials to be held outside the
county and further provides that no hearing except one ex parte shall be
conducted outside the county without the consent of all parties. The words
inserted in Section 84 suggest that the pre-trial conference was not intended
to come within the general provision of Section 70 and that the parties may
not waive the provisions as to the place of the pre-trial conference. Probably
the legislature did not have in mind the provisions of Section 70 in making
the amendment to Section 84. Its lack of attention to other provisions of
the code here, as elsewhere, causes uncertainty.
(22) Person upon whom interrogatoriesmay be served. In Section 85

the legislature added "partner" to the list of "officer, director or managing
agent" upon whom written interrogatories might be served.' 8 ' This addition
was-unnecessary since a "partner" would be a party and hence within the
preceding general designation of "any adverse party." The addition does
no harm by itself, but in Subsection 89(b) and 89(d) the legislature also
changed the designation of agents by providing that if "an officer or general manager" refuses to make discovery certain consequences shall follow.' "
This is somewhat confusing and even may give rise to controversy as to
what persons can make admissions for a corporate party. Whatever result is
desired, the list of officials in Sections 85 and 89 should have been identical.
(23)

Advisory jury and jury trial by consent. The original version of

Subsection 98(c) permitted the trial court to order an advisory jury in any
non-jury case, and to provide for jury trial in any non-jury cases by consent
185. See Clark, Simplified Pleadingin
Series A, No. 18, p. 21.
186. Cf. Report, art. 7, § 5.
187. Cf. Report, art. 12, § 1.

JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION MONOGRAPHS,

188. Cf. Report, art. 12, § 5 (b)(d).
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of the parties except in actions against the state.8 9 The legislature struck
out all reference to the advisory jury and garbled the remaining language so
as to permit jury trial by consent in actions against the state. It is now
silent as to other actions. The writer cannot understand the purpose of this
change. Is it to be inferred that advisory jury is not permitted?190 Cannot
the parties secure jury trial by consent in non-jury cases where the state
is not a party? The answers must lie in the general law as to consent and
waiver of procedural matters; they are not to be found in the Civil Code.
(24) Objections to instructions. The last sentence of Subsection 105 (a)
in its original version provided that no party shall thereafter complain of
the giving or refusing of an instruction unless he made specific objection
before the jury retired. 19' This sentence was stricken by the legislature but
it left the provision to the effect that the court shall afford opportunity for
examination of the instructions prior to their being given and for making
objection out of hearing of the jury. This provision which was permitted
to remain, together with Section 122 as to objections and Subsection 140(a)
as to errors considered on appeal, could well be construed so as to require
an objection prior to the giving of the instruction. If so, how specific must
this objection be? Is an omnibus objection to the entire charge a sufficient
objection for this purpose? No man can make a safe prophecy as to these
important questions until the court has spoken.
(25) Grounds of motion for new trial. The original version said nothing
of the grounds for new trial.392 The theory of this was that the common law
grounds for motion for new trial would prevail, that these were well understood and that any legislative attempt to enumerate them would be unprofitable and perhaps impossible. The legislature inserted a provision in
Section 115 that new trial might be granted for the reason for which they
had heretofore been granted. This would seem to continue the common
law on the subject as modified by existing statutes. However, all the statutes
relative to new trials were repealed by the code. 9 3 Are the repealed statutes
part of the law of new trials under the new code? Specifically the problem
is presented as to whether the old section'94 relative to new trial for failure
of proof, with the technical distinction between variance and failure of
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

Report, art. 13, § 8(c).
See Walther v. Cape Girardeau, 166 Mo. App. 467, 149 S. W. 36 (1912).
Report, art. 13, § 15(a). See supra text at notes 114-115 and following.
See Report, art. 16, § 1.
S. B. 34, § 1.
Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) § 1167.
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preserved1 95

proof, is in effect
To maintain the latter distinction would be
to
the
entire
spirit
of
the new code. The legislature also inserted
contrary
in Section 115 a provision to the effect that only one new trial should be
allowed upon the ground that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. This is similar, in effect, to the present statutory rule,"", but it is
not identical. Hence there is a question as to whether it would ever be
permissible to refer to the present statute or not in order to determine
whether a second new trial may or may not be granted.
(26) Form of motion for new trial. The code is entirely silent as to
whether the motion for new trial must be specific. The legislature added a
provision to Section 119 that every order for new trial shall specify the
ground or grounds thereof, but there is nothing in the provision as to new
trials as to the nature of the motion. Does Subsection 60(a), which is
found with the provisions relative to motions at the pleading stage and
which requires the grounds to be set forth with particularity, apply to
motions for new trial? Again, 197 Sections 122 and 140 are relevant, but
not decisive, and the matter is in doubt.
(27) Necessity of motion for new trial. The problem discussed above
would not have been of great importance under the original version which
contained a section declaring that motion for new trial should not be necessary to obtain review of a judgment as to any objection raised at the trial.108
This section was stricken by the court, which at the same time inserted a
provision requiring motion for new trial for purposes of review.'x0 The
legislature struck out the latter provision 2 00 but did not reinsert the provision
making the motion unnecessary. This creates a most serious ambiguity as
to a most common question. Some pioneering lawyer will doubtless give
the court an opportunity to decide the matter but until then it will not be
known whether and when a motion for new trial is necessary for purpose
of review.
(28) Time of entering judgment. Section 116 provides that if a timely
motion for new trial is filed, the judgment is not final until disposition of
the motion. The legislature inserted a provision in this section to the effect
195. See Ingwerson v. Chicago & Alton Ry., 205 Mo. 328, 103 S.W. 1143
(1907); Peters v. McDonough, 327 Mo. 487, 37 S.W. (2d) 530 (1931).
196. Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) § 1169.
197. See supra text following note 191.
198. Report, art. 16, § 6.
199. See original Senate Bill No. 34, § 144(a).
200. S. B. 34, § 140(a).
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that judgment shall be entered as of the day of the verdict. No reason
is apparent for this insertion, and there is bound to be confusion between
the actual date of the entry, the date judgment is deemed to be entered,
201
and the date at which the judgment becomes final.
(29) Time of granting new trial on the court's own initiative. The
original version of Section 119 provided that a trial court might grant new
trial of its own initiative within ten days after judgment, or, if a motion
for new trial was made upon another ground, at any time before the motion
was passed on.2 0 2 The legislature amended the section so as to permit the
court to grant new trial of its own initiative at any time within thirty days
after entry of judgment.20 3 As the time for appeal is ten days, a trial court
may apparently grant motion for new trial after appeal is taken. There
is nothing impossible about that, and indeed Section 137 contemplates that
the action is not transferred to the appellate court until the transcript on
appeal is filed with that court. However, in so far as possible all matters
should be disposed of in the trial court before the time for appeal, and
Section 119 does not do this.
(30) Preservationof bill of excptions. While Section 122 provides that
exceptions are unnecessary and that it is sufficient to make proper objections, the legislature eliminated the section204 which abolished the bill of
exceptions and its distinction from the record proper. Furthermore the
legislature provided in Subsection 135(a) for the transcript of the record
"including the bill of exceptions." The anomoly of a bill of exceptions
without exceptions is a bothersome, if not a vital, difficulty.20 5 Apparently
this is the common law bill of exceptions, though perhaps the procedure
may be altered by rule. The anamoly cuts deeper. Is the distinction between
the rcord proper and the bill of exceptions preserved under the code? If
so, what is in the record proper, bearing in mind that demurrer has been
abolished? This may be material as to whether motion for new trial is neces20
sary to review a ruling on motion to dismiss at the pleading stagey.
What,
if any, other motions at the pleading stage are parts of the record proper?
The whole matter is up in the air, in contrast with the plain provisions of
201. See S. B. 34, § 119 which provides for the granting of new trial on the
court's own initiative "not later than 30 days after entry of judgment"
202. Report, art. 16, § 5.
203. S. B. 34, § 119.
204. Report, art. 17, § 1.
205. See supra text at notes 117-119.
206. See Hours, MissouRI PLEADING AND PRACTICE (1936) §§ 535-539.
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the omitted' section abolishing the bill of exceptions and the distinction
between the record proper and the bill of exceptions, and of the original
section which provided a simple and clear method of preparing the record
on appeal.207 The matter is further complicated by reason of the fact that
revised Section 135 uses the expression "transcript of the record" apparently
in the same sense as the expression "transcript on appeal" is used in the
surrounding sections. What will the appellant call his appeal papers under
this double nomenclature?
(31)

Methods of preparing the record or transcript on appeal. Doubt

arises as to whether there are two or three methods of preparing the data
for the appellate court's decision. First, there is the bill of exceptions method
indicated by the first part of Subsections 135 (a). Second, Subsection 135(a)
also indicates that an abbreviated or partial transcript of the evidence may
be agreed upon by the parties instead of the bill of exceptions. It is not
clear whether the latter is the same method described in Section 136, which
is more complete in its terms and different in its phraseology and nomenclature. Apparently this is another example of a case where the legislature
in its amending process overlooked another section which covered the matter
fully.
The existing statute forbids the appellate courts from making any rule
requiring any part of the record to be printed but grants power to require
printing of abstracts of the record. 208 In no uncertain terms the new code
provides that appellate courts shall have no power to require parties to
print the transcript of the record including the bill of exceptions or to print
abstracts thereof.20 9 It is interesting to speculate as to whether a rule may
provide for the printing in the appendix of the brief the parts of the record
upon which the party relies, a system which has worked so well in the
210
Circuit Court of Appeals of the Fourth Circuit.
The provisions for making up the record on appeal are scanty and not
nearly as complete as under the existing procedure, the Federal Rules, or
the plans submitted by the court. Probably this deficiency will be supplied
by court rules under Subsection 10(b), though there is a little hitch here
because the legislature eliminated from the specific subjects for rule-making
in Subsection 139(a) the matter of preparation of the record on appeal.
207. Report, art. 17, § 12; cf. Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., Rule 75.
208. Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) § 1197.
209. S. B. 34, § 135(b).
210. Dean, Transcript of Record, in 2 FED. RULES Dec. 27 (1943); Dean,
Fourth Circuit Rule 10 Reduces Brief PrintingCosts (1943) 26 J. AM. JuD. Soc. 148
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(32) Effect on criminal procedure. This is a problem to be considered
independently after the difficulties with reference to civil procedure have
been resolved. Revision of criminal procedure was outside the general scope
of the original proposal. The legislature emphasized the idea that criminal
rules were not changed by expressly declaring that the code does not apply
to procedure in criminal cases "except to the extent that its provisions or any
of them are now or hereafter may be made applicable by statute."21- The
section continues by declaring that if it shall occur that inadvertently the
act may change procedure in criminal cases, the court is directed immediately
to promulgate a rule restoring the provisions of the criminal procedure to
the end that the latter shall not be changed except by legislative act passed
for that specific purpose. Just what does this section mean in the light
of the facts that in the past some of the sections as to criminal procedure
have expressly incorporated the corresponding rule of civil procedure, and
that some of the repealed sections in the general civil code or elsewhere by
their terms or by construction apply to both civil and criminal cases?
For example, Section 1202212 provides that writs of error shall be
brought within one year in any case whether civil or criminal. This section
was expressly repealed by the Civil Code.213 Is this a case in which the

code may "inadvertently" change the practice in criminal case, and therefore
a situation where the court is directed to restore the provision by rule? The
matter is complicated by the provisions of Subsection 10(a) which declares
that rules shall not "be contrary to or inconsistent with the laws in force
for the time being." Is the setting up of a repealed statute by rule contrary
to the law in force for the time being? If so, something like the problem of
renvoi is presented between these two statutes, and the question is, with
which section should the court finally stop in its decision as to whether a rule
should be framed to cover the situation. Although not expressly relating
to criminal cases, there are a number of other sections in the repealed articles
with reference to appeals and writs of error which do, or at least may, relate
to criminal procedure and concerning which the same problem is presented. 2' 4
Another variant of the same problem is presented by Section 4084215

which provided that exceptions may be made as in civil cases and that bills
211. S.B. 34, § 145.
212. Mo.

REv. STAT.

213. S. B. 34, § 1.
214. E.g. Mo.

(1939).

REv. STAT.

428, 92 S.W. 706, 709 (1905).
215. Mo. REv. STAT. (1939).

(1939) § 1229. See State v. Ruck, 194 Mo. 416,
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of exceptions should be settled, etc., as now allowed by law in civil cases.
All the sections with regard to these matters have been repealed by the Civil
Code,216 and in addition exceptions have been expressly abolished therein.217
Another case in this category is Section 4147218 providing that when an appeal or writ of error does not operate as a stay, the transcript shall be made
out, etc., as in civil cases. In both of these situations the additional problem
is presented as to whether the reference statutes refer to the new or the old
civil procedure. Ordinarily such provisions are deemed to refer to the new 210
-which in itself presents still another problem since the new provisions as
to these subjects are scanty or non-existent. Yet Section 145 by its terms
seems to prevent the ordinary construction of reference statutes in the case
of criminal procedure statutes, whereupon the same problem as that mentioned in the previous paragraph is presented.
There seems to be no particular difficulty in the cases of Section 4130220

declaring that appeals in criminal cases are allowed only at the term at
which judgment is entered, and such as Sections 3949, 4005, and 4143221
containing provisions regarding demurrers and dilatory pleas in criminal
cases. These provisions are not changed by the Civil Code, though the corresponding procedure in civil cases is changed.
A problem is presented as to whether the provisions of Section 9 which
declares that terms of court continue until the opening of the next term
affects criminal cases. By itself the section seems of general application, and
it will be extremely inconvenient for the term to continue for the purpose
of civil cases and be terminated as to criminal cases. However, limitations
of the title and the preliminary sections of the Civil Code, and particularly
of Section 145, point in the opposite direction. The same difficulty is presented with reference to the making up of the trial docket. Does Section
91 apply only to making up the docket in civil cases and leave in force
as to criminal cases the statutory method prescribed by Sections 1993 to
1995,222 which has been obsolete in many circuits for many years?

216. S. B. 34, § 1. The sections in question are §§ 1174-1183.
217. S. B. 34, § 122.
218. Mo. REv. STAT. (1939).
219. Gaston v. Lamkin, 115 Mo. 20, 21 S.W. 1100 (1893); St. Louis v. Gunning Co., 138 Mo. 347, 39 S.W. 788 (1897); State v. Rogers, 253 Mo. 399, 161 S.W.
770 (1913); Bowser v. Garwitz, 185 Mo. App. 420, 170 S.W. 927 (1914).
220. Mo. REv. STAT. (1939).
221. Ibid.
222. Ibid.
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There are two other sort of uncertainties in connection with the Civil
Code, though neither the legislature, -nor indeed anyone else, can be charged
with responsibility therefor. The first are the sort of uncertainties which
inhere in the Federal Rules. It is inevitable that even the most carefully
constructed new code should present some problems of interpretation. This
was true of the New York Code adopted in Missouri in 1849. Such a succinct body of rules as the Federal Rules would naturally cause some question
in the minds of those unfamiliar with them. Fortunately, the Federal Rules
are generally well understood by lawyers who practice in the federal courts.
For the sake of those lawyers unfamiliar with those rules and as to subjects
in the Civil Code not covered by the Federal Rules, there might well be
brief explanations or annotations attached to certain sections of the Civil
Code. While these supplements might be supplied unofficially by persons
familiar with the code, there would be marked advantage of quasi-official
annotations or even official explanations in the form of substatutory rules.
To illustrate uncertainties of this sort we may consider Section 61 providing for ten different grounds of motion which may be raised though the
objection or matter does not appear from the pleadings. The section nowhere states what relief the moving party should request in any of the
motions made upon the enumerated grounds. The same is true with reference to the motions provided for in Section 62 for failure to state a legal
claim or defense. For failure to state a claim and in certain other cases a
motion to dismiss the action is clearly proper. This would not apply to
motions to fail to state a defense in the answer, or for security for costs,
or probably for some other kinds of motions. The point is that the motion
should ask for appropriate relief dependent both on the generic grounds and
the situation in a particular case. Certain discretion should exist in framing
the prayer of the motion, which might ask for relief in the alternative, or
for dismissal only if other conditions are not met. 223
At any rate the old demurrer practice should not be retained, wherein
(except in the case of withdrawal or amendment) final judgment followed
if any ground of the demurrer was established. This is made very clear
under the new code as to party objections, for Section 17 provides for motion
to drop or add parties, thus remedying the objection to the suit without the
224
waste motion attached to the old demurrer process on the same ground.
223. See S. B. 34, § 35.
224. Practically all party objections are grounds of demurrer under Mo. REv.
STAT. (1939) § 922.
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Motions on the ground of party objections 're separately provided for only
because they should be permissible at any stage by bringing in proper
parties and striking out improper ones whenever the trial is not delayed
thereby. While the motions enumerated in Section 61 must be made at a
particular time they should be capable of similar directness in result, coupled
with flexibility, both in the form and the prayer of the motion. Bearing in
mind that the code provides that "no technical forms of pleading or motions
are required,' 225 that "pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial
justice, 122 1 and that the entire code "shall be construed to secure the just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action,' '2? there should be
no difficulty with the succinct code provisions relative to motions. "Uncertainties" of this nature do not constitute a defect; instead the broad language
has been used intentionally in the code to provide a direct, flexible and nontechnical procedural system.
The other sort of uncertainty is that connected with the statutory
provisions with reference to civil procedure, which fall outside of the repealed articles of the General Code of Civil Procedure. In both the unrepealed articles of the General Code and scattered elsewhere throughout
the statutes there are many specific provisions which are framed upon the
existing practice, which is altered by the Civil Code. The largest number
of them are concerned with terms of court, but others involve demurrer, 22 0
pleas in abatement, 230 set-offs,283 nonsuits, 23 2 motions in arrest, 2 8 exceptions, 22 4 and writs of error,2 5 all of which are abolished by the Civil Code. The
presence of this problem has always been in the minds of those responsible for
the original draft. Thus, it was provided that the court might harmonize discordant provisions of the statutes by rule, though the legislature limited this
28
to statutes relating to civil procedure. 3
228

Another source of regret, though going only to the matter of form, is
the lack of uniformity in manner of expression resulting from the legislative
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.

S. B. 34, § 35.
Id., § 57.
Id., § 2.
E.g., Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) §§ 341, 869, 6443, 8477.
E.g., id. §§ 1250, 1252, 1265, 1777.
E.g., id. §§ 1478, 1479.
E.g., id. §§ 1449, 2745.
E.g., id. § 1026.
E.g., id. § 6437.
E.g., id. §§ 1508, 6437, 8478.
E.g., id. §§ 270, 7017.
Report, art. 1, § 9(b); S.B. 34 § 10(b).
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amendments. As presented to the legislature the entire code adopted the
succinct style of the Federal Rules. Amendments added by the legislature,
however, generally used the verbose form of legislation prevalent in the
nineteenth century, regardless of whether the amendment adopted the
existing statutory rule,237 or made some new provision.28 Perhaps this is
a nicety which will cause little difficulty. It is even possible that the lack
of uniformity in form may serve as a positive guide to construction by distinguishing the parts within the original plan from those added in the
amending process.
JUDICIAL RULE-MAKING UNDER NEW CODE

The 1938 report of the American Bar Association's Committee on Judicial Administration named judicial rule-making first in the list of means of
improving judicial machinery.239 It is generally recognized that procedural
improvement on any comprehensive basis must find its main hope in such
a system.2 40 Courts are in closer touch with legal machinery and with demands of the bar than the legislature. They are in constant session and
have the time to consider changes in procedure. They are qualified to pass
on the desirability of rules and they can secure the necessary assistance to
do the work. Above all, they are responsible for the administration of justice
and hence should be able to regulate the processes of that administration.2 41
While the new code is the result of negation of general judicial rulemaking, both the main committee and the legislature recognized the desirability, and indeed the necessity, of some sort of rule-making. The committee
included a provision that rules might be promulgated to resolve conflicts in
237. S. B. 34, §§ 23, 96, 106-111.
238. S. B. 34, §§ 26, 135(a).
239. 63 A. B. A. REP. 530 (1938).
240. See Hudson, The Proposed Regulation of Missouri Procedure by Rules
of Court (1916) 13 Mo. BULL., L. SER. 3; Hyde, From Common Law Rules to
Rules at Court (1937) 22 WASH. U. L. Q. 187; Hyde, Observation on Englisi
Experience in Regulation of Practice and Procedure by Court Rules (1938) 9 Mo.
B. J. 44; Sunderland, Rules of Court Governing Practice and Procedure (1938)t
9 Mo. B. J. 198; Wheaton, Courts and the Rule-Making Powers (1936) 1 Mo. L.
REv. 261; Wheaton, ProceduralImprovements and the Rule-Making Power of Our
Courts (1936) 22 A. B. A. J. 642; Note (1938) 23 WASH U. L. Q. 412, 421; Report,
Committee on Anendinents, Judiciary, and Procedure (1938) 9 Mo. B. J. 216;.
Report, Committee on Expediting Trials and Appeals (1940) 11 Mo. B. J 183;
Harris, The Rude-Making Power in JUDICIAL ADMINISnrATION MONOGRAPHS, Series
A, No. 1.
241. See generally supra note 240. The arguments pro and con for rule-making
are set forth in PROBLEMS RELATING TO JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION AND ORGANIZATION, being vol. 9 of the publication of New York State Constitutional Convention Committee (1938) 733, 741-744.
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statutes. 2 42

the code itself and between the code and other
The legislature
adopted this measure except that it authorized rule-making only to alter
statutes on civil procedure.2 43 It is to the credit of both of these bodies
that they recognized the possibility of such conflicts, though they did not
comb the code for the defects, apparently in the belief that the court would
repair any failings which might lurk in their work. At any rate a number
of discoverable defects exist, and as to these a perfecting gloss of rules is
expected.
It is easy enough to say, let the court fix up the code by rule, but this
is a general desideratum within the bounds of which there might be anything from a full set of rules rivaling the Civil Code itself in bulk and reinstating the devices which the legislature eliminated, down to a small
number of rules designed to deal only with the most obvious and pressing
difficulties, keeping well within the bounds of what the legislators would
have desired if they had ever thought of the particular difficulties. Whether
the court follows one or the other of these courses or adopts some position
midway between the two extremes will depend upon its attitude toward
judicial rule-making, as well as its sense of responsibility for the procedure
in force in the judicial system of which it is the highest tribunal.
Several possibilities regarding rule-making under the code remain to
be explored. First there is rule-making under the express terms of the code
itself. By far the most important provisions are found in Section 10.
(1) Substatutory244 rule-making for all courts.

Subsection (a) of Section 10 expressly authorizes the supreme court
to make rules of procedure for all courts of the state as to matters not
inconsistent with the laws for the time being. There is little doubt of the
constitutionality of this provision. 241 Any trial or appellate court, even in
absence of statute, has authority to promulgate rules for cases pending before it, provided the rules are not inconsistent with higher authority.240
242. Report, art. 1, § 9(b).
243. S. B. 34, § 10(b).
244. See generally Williams, The Source of Authority for Rules of Court Affecting Procedure (1937) 22 WAsH. U. L. Q. 459, for an excellent analysis of the subject of rule-making and the application of a clear terminology.
245. Story v. Livingston, 13 Pet. (38 U. S.) 363 (1839); State ex Tel. Ross v.
Call, 39 Fla. 504, 22 So. 748 (1897); Hanna v. Mitchell, 202 App. Div. 504, 196
N. Y. Supp. 43 (1922), aff'd 235 N. Y. 534, 139 N. E. 724 (1923).
246. See cases collected in Caruthers, Administration of Justice in Missouri
(1941) 12 Mo. B. J. 3, 9.
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The highest court of the state perhaps has authority, in absence of statute,
to promulgate substatutory rules binding upon the lower tribunals. 247 When
a statute gives this right, we must look to the constitution to find anything
to prevent the court from exercising this sort of rule-making. Nothing in
the Missouri Constitution curtails the granting of such a power to the
supreme court. 248 The only limitation upon Section 10(a) seems to be another
provision 2 49 within the code itself, giving to the appellate courts, which of
course include the courts of appeals, power to make rules concerning the form
of briefs, certain other matters regarding appeal papers, and the placing of
cases upon the docket. Within the limits envisioned by this provision it
seems that the particular language prevails over the general language of
Section 10 so that each court of appeals may make its own rules as to matters enumerated.
The really important problem concerning Subsection 10(a) is, how far
the rules may go without being inconsistent "with the laws for the time
being"? One problem is whether the word "laws" includes principles reached
by court decision as well as those enacted by statute . It is submitted that
common law rules are not within the phrase. 250 There is -no indication of a
desire to freeze the present non-statutory law of procedure,"or to prevent its
change by any other method than legislation or court decision. Then too
there is at least one school of thought that professes the doctrine that all
possible questions are governed by legal principles though they may not yet
be decided, announced, or discovered.2 5 1 If this philosophy were adopted

247. People v. Callopy, 358 Ill. 11, 192 N.E. 634 (1934); cf. State v. Roy, 40
N. M. 397, 420-423, 60 P. (2d) 646, 660-662, 110 A. L. R. 1, 20-22 (1936). But see
Smith v. Valentine, 19 Minn. 452 (1872-3); Jones v. Boykin, 185 Ga. 606, 196 S.E.
900 (1938) (convention of judges); Moyers v. State, 186 Ga. 446, 197 S.E." 846
(1938) (same).
248. Cf. article VI, § 27 providing that the judges of the Circuit Court of St.
Louis County may sit in general term for the purpose of making rules of court.
249. S. B. 34, § 139.
250. Superficially the celebrated decision of Erie R. R. v. Tompkins, 304
U. S. 64 (1938) might be cited against this contention but the absence of a federal
general common law is a sufficient ground of distinction. Then, too, the words
"in force" suggest legislation and they are not contained in the federal rule of decision law. In addition the Missouri Supreme Court can undoubtedly change the
common law of procedure by decision and to attempt to prevent the court from
doing the same by rule is but to prolong the agony of obsolete case law. Finally
to include decisions in "laws" would practically nullify-the provision of the first
sentence with reference to power to direct the form of writs and process.
251. See criticism of this doctrine in GRay, THE NATURE AND SOURcES OF THE
LAw (2d ed. 1921) 218-240.
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and "laws" were deemed to include non-statutory rules there would be no
opportunity whatever for substatutory rule-making under Subsection 10(a),
though perhaps the true principle might be "announced" by rule.
Assuming that "laws" as used in this section do not include non-statutory law, it remains to be seen what kind of rules would be consistent with
the laws for the time being. It would unduly lengthen this article to discuss
even briefly whether each of the deficiencies 252 already enumerated could be
remedied under the provisions of Subsection 10(a). Surely some could not.
Examples of this category include such matters as abolishing involuntary
nonsuits and permitting special verdicts, for the code contains express provisions allowing one involuntary nonsuit25s and requiring general verdicts.214
In contrast with the latter it would seem that the court could authorize
special interrogatories to accompany the general verdict because the code
nowhere forbids special interrogatories. For the same reason it would seem
that the court could reinsert the provisions for summary judgment,2 and
for permissive counterclaims, 256 though these were stricken from the code
by the General Assembly. It is true that it would be known from what
happened that such rules would be contrary to the wishes of some of the
legislators; still they would come within the powers which the legislature
actually granted to the court under Subsection 10(a). Nothing remaining
in the code prevents the court from announcing forms of pleadings and
instructions by rule.257 An even stronger case could be made for a rule
requiring specific objections to instructions since the legislature, by retaining
the provision for allowing counsel to object before the court's charge, has
paved the way for such a rule.2 8 The court might even enact by rule some
2 9
of the procedural devices which were eliminated by the main committee,
and which were therefore not included in the final report to the court, or in
the court's recommendation to the legislature. Of course, if the "laws" men252. See supra notes 35 to 120.
253. S. B. 34, § 99(b).
254. S. B. 34, § 106 says the verdict may be general or special but § 107 requires general verdict in all cases brought for the recovery of money or specific real
or personal property.
255. See supra text at notes 96-98. Rules for summary judgment procedure
were sustained upon the basis of substatutory rule-making in accordance with
statutory authority in Hanna v. Mitchell, 202 App. Div. 504, 196 N. Y. Supp. 43
(1922) aff'd 235 N. Y. 534, 139 N. E. 724 (1923).
256. See supra text at notes 99 to 102.
257. See supra text at notes 69 to 72.
258. See supra text at notes 114 to 115, 191.
259. See supra text at notes 35 to 59.
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tioned in Subsection 10(a) include common law rules, the court's power
to announce new rules as to matters now covered by decision would be
severely limited. Under this construction rule-making under this subsection
would be restricted to matters of minutix not covered by statute or decision.
(2) Harmonizing rides.
Subsection 10(b) authorizes the court to promulgate rules to harmonize
discordant or inconsistent rules in the code itself, or between the provisions
of the code and the statutes relating to civil procedure. The constitutional
question 26 0 under (1) above applies here, but there is the additional problem
as to whether a statute may authorize the court to supplant existing statutes
by rules of court. The decisions in other jurisdictions make it plain that
such a statute is valid, the rationale of these decisions being that the matter
is partly judicial even if the legislature also has power to frame rules of
2
procedure. 6.

Naturally if there is an inconsistency between existing statutes and the
provisions of the code, the latter must prevail. On account of the predominance of later statutes over earlier ones, this would be true without Subsection 10(b), but that provision also gives the court power to clarify the
matter by rule. Such rules will avoid annoying and complicated problems
of construction and reconciliation of separate statutes. The most frequent
specie of inconsistency between the code and the existing statutes are the
provisions relative to terms of court in connection with general procedure
not changed by the code and with various special proceedings scattered
throughout the statutes. There will also remain on the statute books various
sections relative to demurrers, pleas in abatement, set-offs, nonsuits, motions
in arrest, exceptions, and writs of error, which devices, at least in name, are
abolished by the code. These inconsistencies262 and other of like nature
might be handled by the court in various ways. First, the court might not
promulgate any rules whatever, leaving the matters to be worked out by
the ordinary principles of reconciliation between earlier and later statutes
260. See supra text at notes 245 to 248.
261. Burney v. Lee, 59 Ariz. 360, 129 P. (2d) 308 (1942); State v. Roy, 40
N. M. 397, 60 P. (2d) 646, 110 A. L. R. 1 (1936); State ex rel. Fostert-Wyman
Lumber Co. v. Superior Court, 148 Wash. 1, 267 Pac. 770 (1928); In re Constitutionality of Section 251.18 Wisconsin Statutes, 204 Wis. 501, 236 N.W. 717 (1931).
As to the large number of jurisdictions which have such legislation, see Harris, The
Ride-Making Power, in JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION MONOGRAPHS, Series A, No. 1,
6-10, 12, 21-22.
262. See supra text at notes 228 to 235.
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on the same subject. While Subsection 10(b) merely gives the court power,
and does not purport to require the court, to promulgate harmonizing rules,
there is every reason why the court should do so. Conceivably the court
might enact a separate rule with respect to every inconsistent old section
and in effect rewrite them. Principally on account of term of court provisions, rules of this nature would bulk large and entail much labor in the
framing and the use of the rules. The remaining possibility seems best:
the enactment of a few general rules to cover the various types of situations, announcing the way in which the court believes that the code affects
existing Statutes which have not been expressly repealed. Under this plan
a re-phrasing of the conflicting statutes could await the next general revision
of the statutes.
A number of instances of discord within the code itself have already
been noted.263 Apparently here the court is not limited to accepting the
version of any of the conflicting sections but a new provision can be made
by rule which will prevail under the authority of Subsection 10(b). While
a general attitude toward rule-making under the authority of Section 10
will doubtless be manifested by the court, each case, or at least each type of
case, will present a separate problem. Detailed consideration is necessary
even if the power is exercised sparingly.
(3) General superstatutory rule-making.
There is a broader aspect of judicial rule-making than is presented by
Section 10, namely the question of whether the court has power under the
constitution to promulgate rules of procedure which would abrogate or enlarge the statutory procedure. Dean Wigmore asserted the thesis in no uncertain terms that the framing of rules of procedure is not a legislative function at all but rather a judicial function, and that statutory procedural
codes are utterly unconstitutional. 26 4 Other writers 25 have not agreed with
200
Surely
Wigmore and the actual holdings in few, if any, cases support him.
the many courts recognizing and enforcing legislative codes have not shown
an'inclination to subscribe to his doctrine. 267 The Missouri Constitution
263. See supra text at notes 143 to 210.
264. Wigmore, All Legislative Rules for Judiciary Procedure Are Void Constitutionally (1928) 23 ILL. L. REv. 276, reprinted (1936) 20 J. AM. JUD. SOC. 159.
265. Williams, The Source of Authority for Rules of Court Affecting Procedure
(1937) 23 WASH. U. L. Q. 459; Hibschman, The Power to Regulate Court Procedure
(1937) 71 U. S. L. REv. 618; Harris, The Rule-Making Power in JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION MONOGRAPHS, Series A, No.1, passim.
266. See Kolkman v. People, 89 Colo. 8, 300 Pac. 575 (1931).
267. See Clark v. Austin, 340 Mo. 467, 488, 101 S.W. (2d) 977, 988 (1937).
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contains provisions2 6s indicating that procedure framing is a proper legislative function, though it does not indicate that its authority is exclusive, nor
that there are not limitations to legislative activity in this field.
While article III of the Missouri Constitution on its face may indicate
that the legislative, executive and judicial functions of government are distinct and mutually exclusive, it is well recognized that certain activities be
in the twilight zone may be exercised by more than one of the branches.2 6 9
Procedural rule-making is a case of this category. The propriety of legislation as to procedure is recognized both in the constitution itself and by the
court's enforcement of legislative provisions for more than a century. Inherent limitations upon legislative authority in this particular field have
not been adjudged in any Missouri case. However, decisions in the analogous
fields of admission to the bar, bar discipline, and the practice of law by
laymen are extremely suggestive of the solution of the present problem.
Thus in Clark v. Austin2 P0 Chief Justice Ellison, speaking for a majority
of the court, says:
"But in addition to their exclusive power to determine justiciable
controversies and the constitutionality of statutes involved therein,
they [the courts] have . . . 'another special interest.' It is the inherent power to protect their own existence and functioning as constitutional courts, which includes the right to regulate the practice
of law. They can make rules on that subject when there are no
statutes, or supplementing statutes and imposing additional regulations. And they can. strike down as unconstitutionally usurping
judicial power, any statute unreasonably encroaching upon, and
therefore frustrating their right to protect themselves."
In that case the court had before it the question of whether respondents,
laymen, were engaged in the unlawful practice of law by appearing before
the Public Service Commission in a representative capacity. The majority
opinion mentions statutes regulating court procedure but only to the effect
that the legislature may enter this field and that the matter is not exclusively judicial. No reason is suggested why statutes governing procedure

268. Art. IV, § 53(4), (17), (18), (30) (forbidding special legislation); Art.
VI, § 35 (requiring uniform probate practice).
269. See Rhodes v. Bill, 230 Mo. 138, 150, 130 S.W. 465, 468 (1910); In re
Birmingham Drainage District, 274 Mo. 140, 150, 202 S.W. 404, 406 (1918).
270. 340 Mo. 467, 496, 101 S.W. (2d) 977, 994 (1937). For a careful analysis
of the opinions in this case, see Howard, Control of Unauthorized Practice befolw
Administrative Tribunals in Missouri (1937) 2 Mo. L. REv. 313.
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may not be struck down as frustrating the court's power. Indeed the very
mention271 of such statutes in the opinion suggests that they may.
The Missouri Supreme Court in 1934 announced rules of court which
increased the statutory requirements for admission to the bar 27 2 and rules
governing the conduct of the bar.278 The court did not fail to act with
reference to rules governing personnel though it had not acted before. The
motivation which gave rise to the court's action was no academic or theoretical argument as to the limitations upon the legislative and judicial prerogatives. It was rather a wide-spread discontentment manifested in the press,
among laymen, and within the bar itself with the personnel and conduct of
some members of the bar and others who assumed their functions. These
complaints and the causes underlying them did not increase the powers of
the court but gave rise to the court's assertion of its power to nullify legislation which thwarted the court's power to regulate and purify the judicial
household.
Not only is there analogy from the legal standpoint between the regulation of the bar and of procedural rules, but there is analogy between the
fact situations giving occasion for the assertion of judicial authority. In
spite of better standards of legal education and of a bar membership with
stricter ethical standards, the courts have not held their rightful place in
24
the settlement of disputes. Even before the war litigation had fallen off. 1
The continued rise of administrative tribunals, and of the settlement of disputes through arbitration and trade associations, together with the stark
abandonment of claims which cannot be collected without suit, indicate
popular dissatisfaction with judicial machinery. With increasing frequency
people fail to seek their legal remedies which the courts are supposed to
provide. If this tendency is not curtailed, t.he civil action may become as
obsolete as the presentment of the grand jury, the writ of privilege, or some
of the other ancient procedures which have fallen into disuse.
Procedural rule-making is a proper function of the courts. The fact
271. See supra note 267. See also Petition of Florida State Bar Ass'n for Promulgation of New Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, 145 Fla. 223, 199 So. 57 (1940);
Bumey v. Lee, 59 Ariz. 360, 129 P. (2d) 308 (1942).
272. 334 Mo. appendix, p. xvii.
273. Id., at p. vii.
274. Figures for the Missouri courts of appeals show that between 1932 and
1942 there was a falling off of something like forty per cent in cases filed. See
.Report, Special Committee to Make Survey and Report on Appellate Courts (1943)
14 Mo. B. J. 253, 257-258. See generally, Seacat, The Problem of Decreasing Litigation (1940) 8 K. C. L. REv. 135.
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that it may be delegated to the courts by legislation is proof of that.27 5 The
Civil Code itself purports to give some superstatutory power to the courts. 27 6
However, the fact that rule-making is, in part at least, judicial does not
mean that all legislative attempts to regulate it are invalid. Only when the
legislative rule frustrates the court in the administration of justice should
the court abrogate the rule.
When does a legislative rule or code of procedure frustrate the administration of justice? Surely it does so when the statutes in question drive
claimants from the courts, or leave them in such a disgusted frame of mind
that they will not again resort to the law. How bad does a rule or a code
have to be before it will have appreciable effect along this line? This of
course depends upon the time and place. The Missouri 'code of 1849 was
such an improvement upon the pre-existing common law that it could not
be said to have that effect. It was in accord with best legal thought of the
day and with the horse and buggy stage of society. Since then there has been
stupendous change and advance in the society which the law serves. The
spirit of a highly competitive commerce and industry demands the same
degree of efficiency in its legal services as it does in its own internal affairs
of management. The same is true of labor and other organized groups. All
these, and individuals as well, are used to convenience and speed in transportation, communication and affairs in general. Naturally they believe that
the law should keep up with the other phases of life. A business which uses
the mails for the transmissal of its own communications and resorts to conferences with its employees and associates as a means of determining what
issues if any exist between them will demand that lawyers and courts use
the same sort of devices in their work.
In a nutshell the only system of procedure which will not frustrate the
administration of justice in this day and age is the most efficient system that
can be devised. Otherwise the public will suffer, and suffering, will not resort
to the courts, and the settlement of disputes will in large measure be taken
out of judicial hands.
Of course, the matter is one of degree. If the court accepts the doctrine
that legislation regarding procedure can be struck down as frustrating the
judicial power and that new rules may be announced by the court, it might
choose to proceed cautiously. It might, for example, put back into the code
275. See supra note 261.
276. See supra text from not 261 to note 263.
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only a few of the provisions emasculated by the legislature and which could
not be remedied under the terms of Section 10. It might go further and consider the code proposed and the code enacted as units-the first well-knit,
consistent, and progressive, the second a mangled, self-contradictory system
with many modern procedural devices entirely lacking. This philosophy
would lead to a promulgation of the plan substantially as suggested by the
court to the legislature. Indeed the court could go still further and enact
many of the rules and cover much of the ground which the committee appointed by the court excluded from the code. This could be done without
stultification for it is well known that in the preparation of the draft the
committee was greatly influenced by a desire to offer a plan of which the
legislature would approve. This factor doubtless also influenced the court
in its recommendation of the committee's plan. The attempt on the part
of the court to procure a superior procedure without clash with a coordinate
branch of the government having failed, there is no occasion for the court
to proceed along the same cautious lines as it did with reference to a plan
for the improvement of civil procedure through court recommended legislation.
This is no denial of the principle of democratic government, being closest
to the people, should have the ultimate voice in policy-making. Neither of
these precepts are thought to be violated by the judicial power to declare
legislation unconstitutional, nor by the more recently asserted power to set
up rules exceeding the statutory requirements for admission to the bar and
the practice of law. Conceding the undoubted fact that legislators, and
particularly lawyer-legislators, regard procedure-framing as part of their
legislative prerogative, it may be open to question as to how much their
position is asserted because of desire to control the subject-matter as a symbol
of power and how much it is asserted in the public interest. This is an imponderable element and it would be unprofitable to do any more than suggest the possibility. However, it can be asserted much more confidently that
the people blame the courts rather than legislature for the expense, delays,
and uncertainties of legislation. At any rate it is perfectly clear that these
factors do affect and threaten the functioning of the judicial branch. Accordingly that branch should decide what provisions for procedure must be made
in order that citizens will freely resort to the courts for settlement of their
disputes. To take any other position would be to admit that the legislature
is something more, and the courts something less, than coordinate branches
of government.
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Surely -no public uprising will result from the court's assertion of this
power. Legislators may temporarily feel piqued but they would soon become
reconciled to the reasonableness of the position. Indeed once the step had
been taken the legislature would probably find real comfort in being relieved
of a function for which it is not fitted and has not done well. The lawmaking
branch could then confine itself to their ever-increasing business which cannot be said to lie in the twilight zone of governmental powers.
A CONSTITUTIONAL SOLUTION

While these words are being written a constitutional convention is in
session at Jefferson City. What that convention does may determine the
future of the administration of justice in Missouri for fifty years or more.
The convention has it in its power to settle the question of the authority
and responsibility of procedural rule-making by vesting these in the supreme
court. Several states already have such constitutional provisions.277
The judiciary article proposed by the Missouri 1922-1923 Constitutional
Convention contained provision for judicial rule-making but this was made
subject to legislative annulment or amendment or new rule created in lieu
thereof by the legislature by special law limited to that purpose. 278 The joint
committees of the judiciary and the Missouri Bar Association have recommended a similar provision to the present convention, except that authorization for a new rule by legislative enactment was eliminated from the joint
committees' proposal though the power of legislative amendment was retained. 27 9 This sort of provision may be better than none, though it opens
the door to the same sort of tinkering that happened in the case of the Civil
Code. No reason is apparent why the legislature, which so emasculated a
draft which it had invited the court to make, would accord a set of rules
under constitutional authority with any different sort of treatment. Only
gubernatorial veto under the proposed constitutional amendment lessens the
chance for the sort of legislative muddling which took place in the enactment
of the Civil Code.
Indeed such constitutional legislative control over judicial rule-making
may lead to worse consequences than the* legislative derangement of the
court's proposals for the new code. While it would probably not be contended that under this constitutional proposal special legislative bills de277. MD. CONST., Art. 4, § 18; MICH., CoNsT., Art. VI, § 5; WASH. CONsT., Art.
4, § 24.
278. See Mo. Manual (1923-1924) p. 531, § 25.
279. Proposal No. 21 in the 1943 Constitutional Convention of Missouri, § 25.
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signed to amend court rules would not be subject to the provision of due
process or other express constitutional limitations, the judicial power to
control the legislature's frustration of the administration of justice by special
bills as to procedure would apparently be non-existent. It would not seem
permissible for the court to nullify by rule the legislature's amendments
to the court rules. It is doubtful whether the legislature could amend one
of its own amendments to judicial rules, since the proposed constitutional
provision seems to contemplate judicial initiation of new procedure provisions and legislative action only with regard to judicial rules. It would thus
appear that after the court had established a set of rules, the legislature "by
amendment" could reenact the pre-existing code (or another of its own
making) which would then be incapable of being altered by either court or
legislature. In case of legislative repeal without amendment of a judicial
rule it would be problematical whether the former statute or rule is reestablished, the common law is restored, or an absence of law results. Of
course it is freely admitted that the proposed constitutional provisions might
receive-with a little straining-a more fortunate and more definite interpretation than indicated above. Enough has been said, however, to demonstrate the unsatisfactory and questionable character of the new proposal.
It is true that the act of Congress which authorized the supreme court
to prescribe rules for civil actions in the district courts provided that in case
the court united the rules for cases at law and in equity, the united rules
should not take effect until they should be reported to Congress at the
beginning of a regular session and until the close of such session.20 The rules
were presented to Congress but while thoroughly considered in committee
they were not in any respect amended or repealed. This is quite a different
attitude from that which the Missouri General Assembly took toward the
suggestions of the court as to the Civil Code. Furthermore, the act of Congress contemplated action only at the session at which the rules are reported.
The proposed constitutional provision is unlimited as to time and legislative
amendment or repeal could come at any subsequent session.
There is no basis in the court's recent decisions as to procedural matters, nor in its suggestions for the new Civil Code, to cast any doubt upon
the court's superior judgment in this field. Experience with the enactment
of the code has shown that the desirability of a check upon the court's power
is far outweighed by the undesirable results which follow from a legislative
280. 28 U. S. C. A. H 723(b), 723(c) (1934).
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check. Difficulty will be encountered with the operation of the new code;
indeed that would have been true to some extent even if the court's suggestions had been fully accepted. Who will bear the responsibility for the difficulties? There will probably be finger-pointing at both bodies, but the
real blame should be attached to the method which produced the Civil Code.
Only by complete and unhampered judicial rule-making can responsibility
be fixed and best results obtained for the conduct of litigation in our courts.
While much progress can be made by curative rule& under express authority
of the new code and by rules under the court's non-frustrating power, a
constitutional provision for general superstatutory rule-making is the best
method of preserving the courts for litigants and litigants for the courts.
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